“Direct Republican Democracy?” is a fascinating post at Prawfsblog, a collective of law professors. In it, Michael T. Morley describes a candidate for Boulder City Council with a plan to vote “the way voters tell him,” and discusses how that might not be really representative of what people want, and how it differs from (small-r) republican government. Worth a few moments of your time.
Some of what I’ve read over the past quarter, and want to recommend each of the books below as worthy of your time.
- The Internet of Risky Things, Sean Smith. This was a surprisingly good short read. What I gained was an organized way of thinking and a nice reference for thinking through the issues of IOT. Also, the lovely phrase “cyber Love Canal.”
- American Spies, Jennifer Stisa Granick. Again, surprisingly good, laying out with the logical force that really good lawyers bring, explaining both sides of an issue and then explaining the frame in which you should understand it.
- Saving Bletchley Park, Sue Black. (Title links to publisher, who sells ebook & print, or you can go to Amazon, who only sells the hardback.) The really interesting story of the activism campaign to save Bletchley Park, which was falling apart 20 years ago. Dr. Black is explicit that she wrote the book to carry the feel of an internet campaign, with some stylistic bits that I found surprising. I was expecting a drier style. Don’t make my mistake, and do read the book. Also, visit Bletchley Park: it’s a great museum.
Nonfiction, not security
- Black Box Thinking: Why Most People Never Learn from Their Mistakes–But Some Do, Matthew Syed. Mr. Syed is a journalist, and has written a fantastic and highly readable account of how talking about mistakes helps prevent future problems.
- We have No Idea, Jorge Cham, Daniel Whiteson take on what modern physics doesn’t know about the world. Great education with enough fun to entertain, not distract. Except maybe the gravity puns. Those could have been spaced out more, so as to not crush the intervening ideas. Because I’ve updated my models of the universe while reading We Have No Idea, this news was easier to understand “Half the universe’s missing matter has just been finally found.”
- N. K. Jemisin’s Broken Earth Series. Outstanding writing, interesting worldbuilding, and the first two books have both won Hugos. First book is “The Fifth Season.” Bump it up in your queue.
- The Rise and Fall of D.O.D.O, Neal Stephenson and Nicole Galland. I’m not (yet) familiar with Galland’s work, much of which seems to be historical fiction. This fairly breezy and fun time travel read, much less dense than most of Stephenson’s recent books.
The New York Times reports on how many of Alan Lomax’s recordings are now online, “The Unfinished Work of Alan Lomax’s Global Jukebox.” This is a very interesting and important archive of musical and cultural heritage. The Global Jukebox. I was going to say that Lomax and Harry Smith were parallel, and that the Anthology of American Folk Music is a similar project, but I was wrong, Smith drew heavily on Lomax’s work.
Well, Richard Smith has “resigned” from Equifax.
The CEO being fired is a rare outcome of a breach, and so I want to discuss what’s going on and put it into context, which includes the failures at DHS, and Deloitte breach. Also, I aim to follow the advice to praise specifically and criticize in general, and break that pattern here because we can learn so much from the specifics of the cases, and in so learning, do better.
Smith was not fired because of the breach. Breaches happen. Executives know this. Boards know this. The breach is outside of their control. Smith was fired because of the post-breach chaos. Systems that didn’t work. Tweeting links to a scam site for two weeks. PINS that were recoverable. Weeks of systems saying “you may have been a victim.” Headlines like “Why the Equifax Breach Stings So Bad” in the NYTimes. Smith was fired in part because of the post-breach chaos, which was something he was supposed to control.
But it wasn’t just the chaos. It was that Equifax displayed so much self-centeredness after the breach. They had the chutzpah to offer up their own product as a remedy. And that self-dealing comes from seeing itself as a victim. From failing to understand how the breach will be seen in the rest of the world. And that’s a very similar motive to the one that leads to coverups.
In The New School Andrew and I discussed how fear of firing was one reason that companies don’t disclose breaches. We also discussed how, once you agree that “security issues” are things which should remain secret or shared with a small group, you can spend all your energy on rules for information sharing, and have no energy left for actual information sharing.
And I think that’s the root cause of “U.S. Tells 21 States That Hackers Targeted Their Voting Systems” a full year after finding out:
The notification came roughly a year after officials with the United States Department of Homeland Security first said states were targeted by hacking efforts possibly connected to Russia.
A year after states were first targeted. A year in which “Obama personally warned Mark Zuckerberg to take the threats of fake news ‘seriously.’” (Of course, the two issues may not have been provably linkable at the time.) But. A year.
I do not know what the people responsible for getting that message to the states were doing during that time, but we have every reason to believe that it probably had to do with (and here, I am using not my sarcastic font, but my scornful one) “rules of engagement,” “traffic light protocols,” “sources and methods” and other things which are at odds with addressing the issue. (End scornful font.) I understand the need for these things. I understand protecting sources is a key role of an intelligence service which wants to recruit more sources. And I also believe that there’s a time to risk those things. Or we might end up with a President who has more harsh words for Australia than the Philippines. More time for Russia than Germany.
In part, we have such a President because we value secrecy over disclosure. We accept these delays and view them as reasonable. Of course, the election didn’t turn entirely on these issues, but on our electoral college system, which I discussed at some length, including ways to fix it.
All of which brings me to the Deloitte breach, “Deloitte hit by cyber-attack revealing clients’ secret emails.” Deloitte, along with the others who make up the big four audit firms, gets access to its clients deepest secrets, and so you might expect that the response to the breach would be similar levels of outrage. And I suspect a lot of partners are making a lot of hat-in-hand visits to boardrooms, and contritely trying to answer questions like “what the flock were you people doing?” and “why the flock weren’t we told?” I expect that there’s going to be some very small bonuses this year. But, unlike our relationship with Equifax, boards do not feel powerless in relation to their auditors. They can pick and swap. Boards do not feel that the system is opaque and unfair. (They sometimes feel that the rules are unfair, but that’s a different failing.) The extended reporting time will likely be attributed to the deep analysis that Deloitte did so it could bring facts to its customers, and that might even be reasonable. After all, a breach is tolerable; chaos afterwards may not be.
The two biggest predictors of public outrage are chaos and coverups. No, that’s not quite right. The biggest causes are chaos and coverups. (Those intersect poorly with data brokerages, but are not limited to them.) And both are avoidable.
So what should you do to avoid them? There’s important work in preparing for a breach, and in preventing one.
- First, run tabletop response exercises to understand what you’d do in various breach scenarios. Then re-run those scenarios with the principals (CEO, General Counsel) so they can practice, too.
- To reduce the odds of a breach, realize that you need continuous and integrated security as part of your operational cycles. Move from focusing on pen tests, red teams and bug bounties to a focus on threat modeling, so you can find problems systematically and early.
I’d love to hear what other steps you think organizations often miss out on.
A PARROT has become the latest voice to fool Amazon’s Alexa voice assistant after ordering gift boxes using an Amazon Echo. Buddy the African Grey Parrot, mimicked his owner’s voice so convincingly that her Amazon Echo accepted the order for six gift boxes. (“
Parrot mimics owner to make purchases using Amazon Echo.”)
As Alexa has a facility to require a PIN code before placing an order, it was really down to the family that their bird was able to make the request.
Of course, Buddy would have been unable to learn the PIN.
Via Michael Froomkin.
There’s an interesting new paper at bioRXiv, “The Readability Of Scientific Texts Is Decreasing Over Time.”
Lower readability is also a problem for specialists (22, 23, 24). This was explicitly shown by Hartley (22) who demonstrated that rewriting scientific abstracts, to improve their readability, increased academics’ ability to comprehend them. While science is complex, and some jargon is unavoidable (25), this does not justify the continuing trend that we have shown.
Ironically, the paper is released as a PDF, which is hard to read on a mobile phone. There’s a tool, pandoc, which can easily create HTML versions from their LaTeX source. I encourage everyone who cares about their work being read to create HTML and ebook versions.
“Threat Modeling and Architecture” is the latest in a series at Infosec Insider.
After I wrote my last article on Rolling out a Threat Modeling Program, Shawn Chowdhury asked (on Linkedin) for more informatioin on involving threat modeling in the architecture process. It’s a great question, except it involves the words “threat, “modeling,” and “architecture.” And each of those words, by itself, is enough to get some people twisted around an axle.
Allow me to mention that there are still seats available at my training session in London 16-17 October, in cooperation with DevSecCon!
Usually, I do training for an organization, so this is your only chance this year to book a single seat.
(Via Davide Mancino)
[Thursday, September 21th is the latest of 5 updates.]
When I wrote “The Breach Response Market Is Broken,” I didn’t expect one of the players to validate everything I had to say. What I said was that the very act of firms contracting with breach response services inhibit the creation of a market for breach response, and the FTC should require them to give vouchers to consumers.
Vice Motherboard is reporting that “Firm Hired to Monitor Data Breaches Is Hacked, 143 Million Social Security Numbers Stolen.”
It’s not clear what database was accessed. On their website, Equifax says “No Evidence of Unauthorized Access to Core Consumer or Commercial Credit Reporting Databases” and “Company to Offer Free Identity Theft Protection and Credit File Monitoring to All U.S. Consumers.”
But here’s the thing; I don’t trust Equifax to protect data that … they just failed to protect. I want protection from an independent firm.
Equifax’s self-dealing in providing breach response services is unfair. No rational, well-informed consumer would select Equifax’s service in this situation. Equifax’s offering of credit file monitoring to all US consumers is also an unfair trade practice, which undercuts innovation, and limits the ability of new entrants to deliver effective services.
The FTC should require Equifax to send a voucher to each impacted individual which can be used to purchase any identity theft protection service on the market as of August, 2017.
Usually I don’t try to blog fast moving stories, but I may make an exception.
Update 1, later that day:
- Jeremiah Grossman points out: “As we’ve seen, breaches often negatively impact stocks (1-10%). We also know prices quickly bounce back. If we’re really smart, we’d buy.” I wonder — will this impact their business substantially? Probably revenue will be unaffected; costs may go up, not in the sense of notification (they’re not bothering to mail you a letter) or breach response costs, but in expenses around computer security: software, staff, subscriptions, which may depress profitability over time if most of the new expenses are a new normal after an FTC consent decree.
- Brian Krebs has context and history.
- Bloomberg reports that “Three Equifax Managers Sold Stock Before Cyber Hack Was Revealed.” “None of the filings lists the transactions as being part of 10b5-1 pre-scheduled trading plans.”
Update 2, Sept 9:
- The International Business Times reports “Equifax Lobbied To Kill Rule Protecting Victims Of Data Breaches.” They report Equifax wrote “a rule blocking companies from forcing their customers to waive class action rights would expose credit agencies ‘to unmanageable class action liability that could result in full disgorgement of revenues’ if companies are found to have illegally harmed their customers.” It’s a nice life, having the government block your victims from suing you, especially if you’re worried that the harm is great enough to result in ‘full disgorgement of revenues.’ Now, you might argue that’s hyperbole, but maybe it’s a real fear.
- The Onion reports “Equifax Impressed By Hackers’ Ability To Ruin People’s Finances More Efficiently Than Company Can.”
- Equifax once brought me to a Nine Inch Nails concert, and under the payola rules, I ought to have disclosed that when writing about them. It was over a decade ago, and had slipped my mind.
Update 3, Sept 12:
- TechCrunch reports “no matter what, Equifax may tell you you’ve been impacted by the hack,” even for random last name and SSN combos. Maybe that’s not trying to drive anxiety, but their data really is that bad? (Thanks to Joey Gray for the pointer.)
- Patrick McKenzie has a long article on what to do when a bank issues credit to someone they think is you, “Identity Theft, Credit Reports, and You.”
Update 4, September 16:
- Lawmakers: The Democrats of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce sent Equifax a letter, as did Senators Hatch and Wyden, (Hatch/Wyden Letter), and 30 state attorneys general, “States Call On Equifax To Halt Marketing Of Its Paid Credit Monitoring Service.”
- In other legislative news, “Sen. Elizabeth Warren slams Equifax and introduces bill to ban fees for freezing credit.”
- Someone tried to report the PIN generation issue over a year ago.
- Equifax’s CEO makes statements intended to reassure in USA Today, including “We are devoting extraordinary resources to make sure this kind of incident doesn’t happen again,” but they don’t seem to have reported that claim to their shareholders via an 8K. (The one I see at the SEC, filed September 7, says “it’s too early to tell.”)
- Reporters: Bob Sullivan has a “what now.” I respect Bob as a consumer-centric reporter, and he’s covered these issues for a while. I’m quoted in Howstuffworks’s “After the Equifax Breach, Does Credit Fraud Monitoring Really Help?”
- The public has still not been told what database was accessed.
Update 5, September 21:
- “Equifax Has Been Sending Consumers to a Fake Phishing Site for Almost Two Weeks.” I believe that Gizmodo means either “a phishing site” or “a fake, phishing site,” because the site to which Equifax was directing people was not theirs.
- Equifax’s former Chief Privacy Officer posted “Understanding the Equifax Data Breach,” including an explanation of why the breach was likely consumer dispute information.