Questions about a Libyan no-fly zone
With the crisis in Japan, attention to the plight of those trying to remove Colonel Kaddafi from power in Libya has waned, but there are still calls, including ones from the Arab League, to impose a no-fly zone. Such a zone would “even the fight” between the rebels and Kaddafi’s forces.
There are strong calls to move quickly, such as “Fiddling While Libya Burns” in the New York Times. But I think there are some important questions that I haven’t heard answered. A no-fly zone is a military intervention in Libya. It involves an act of war against the current government, and however bad that government is, we need to consider the question not of a “no-fly zone” but an “act of war” and its implications.
Some questions I’d love to hear answered include:
- What if it doesn’t work? Are we willing to put soldiers on the ground to support the rebels?
- What if it does? Who’s in charge?
- What if it half works? We imposed a no fly zone in Iraq in 1991, and then invaded 11 years later because we hadn’t thought through the question of what we do to remove the no-fly zone. If the rebels end up with a Kurdistan, how do we finish? Another invasion?
Flywalk away and let the Libyan air force to bomb in 2 years? - What does success look like? What’s our goal? Do we support offensive operations? If the rebels end up with some aircraft, do we let them fly?
There are other questions, about sovereignty, but I think there’s a good tradeoff to be made between preventing democide and respecting sovereignty. But I haven’t seen a proposal which seems to have considered what happens after a no-fly zone is imposed. Is there one?
In regard to the last point, there was a report that the rebels used two MiGs to attack artillery positions of Kaddafi’s army.