Account Recovery

Access to an account is access to an account. A lot of systems talk about “backup” authentication, but make that backup authentication available at all times. This has led to all sorts of problems, because the idea that the street you grew up on is a secret didn’t make sense even before Yahoo! “invalidated“it. Not to mention that even when answers to these questions are freeform, they tend to have only a few bits of entropy. Colors? First names? All have distributions. Then there’s the ones who insist they know your answers: United Airlines Account Recovery Questions

One of the people who’s focused on really improving account recovery is Brad Hill, and at F8, Facebook announced some new tech which I think is a very useful new point in the design space.

As developers, we talk a lot about building experiences that people love. But there’s one experience that never fails to elicit a groan from people everywhere: recovering an account after forgetting your password.

[…]
Delegated Account Recovery helps people and businesses recover their accounts using the services that they trust. It is an open protocol that gives companies the ability to provide better and more secure options to their customers for regaining access to their accounts. Facebook — and other providers in the future — can help people verify who they are when they forget their password, lose their two-factor codes, or don’t want to answer security questions based on personal information. (“Delegated Account Recovery Now Available in Beta.”)

It’s worth checking out.

And not that I’m trying to make trouble for anyone, but at what point does relying on use of a “secret” question like “street you grew up on” become the sort of unfair trade practice that garners regulatory attention? My guess is that the availability of credible alternatives brings that day closer.

A New Blog

When I started blogging a dozen years ago, the world was different. Over time, I ended up with at least two main blogs (Emergent Chaos and New School), and guest posting at Dark Reading, IANS, various Microsoft blogs, and other places.

I decided it’s time to bring all that under a single masthead, and hey, get TLS finally. I’ve imported the EmergentChaos and New School archives, but not the others. For those others, I’ll post a link here as I post there.

If you subscribe to either or both, I suggest subscribing here; I’ll post reminders to those other blogs to move as well. If you maintain a link to either of the old blogs, please update it to point here.

I’m sure I’ve broken things in the imports, please let me know what they are.


In the near future, I’ll set up redirects from the old blogs to here.

Syria

So I’m curious: on what basis is the President of the United States able to issue orders to attack the armed forces of Syria?

It is not on the basis of the 2001 “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” cited in many instances, because there has been no claim that Syria was involved in the 9/11 attacks. (Bush and then Obama both stretched this basis incredibly, and worryingly, far. But both took care to trace back to an authorization.)

It is not on the basis of an emergency use of force because the United States was directly threatened.

Which leaves us with, as the NY Times reports:

Mr. Trump authorized the strike with no congressional approval for the use of force, an assertion of presidential authority that contrasts sharply with the protracted deliberations over the use of force by his predecessor, Barack Obama. (“Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria.”)

Or, as Donald Trump once said:

Trump-Syria.png

Seriously, what is the legal basis of this order?

Have we really arrived at a point where the President of the United States can simply order the military to strike anywhere, anytime, at his personal discretion?

More Satellites Than You Can Shake a Stick At

This video is really amazingly inspiring:

Not only does it show more satellites than I’ve ever seen in a single frame of video, but the rocket that took them up was launched by the Indian Space Research Organisation, who managed to launch not only the largest satellite constellation ever, but had room for a few more birds in the launch. It’s an impressive achievement, and it (visually) crystalizes a shift in how we approach space. Also, congratulations to the team at Planet, the ability to image all of Earth’s landmass every day.

Launching a micro satellite into low Earth orbit is now accessible to hobbyists. Many readers of this blog could do it. That’s astounding. Stop and think about that for a moment. Our failure to have exciting follow-on missions after Apollo can obscure the fascinating things which are happening in space, as it gets cheap and almost boring to get to low Earth orbit. The Economist has a good summary. That’s not to say that there aren’t things happening further out. This is the year that contestants in the Google Lunar XPrize competition must launch. Two tourists have paid a deposit to fly around the moon.

But what’s happening close to the planet is where the economic changes will be most visible soon. That’s not to say it’s the only thing to watch, but the same engines will enable more complex and daring missions.

For more on what’s happening in India around space exploration and commercialization, this is a fascinating interview with Susmita Mohanty.

Video link: ISRO PSLV-C37 onboard camera view of 104 satellites deployment

Learning Lessons from Incidents

After the February, 2017 S3 incident, Amazon posted this:

We are making several changes as a result of this operational event. While removal of capacity is a key operational practice, in this instance, the tool used allowed too much capacity to be removed too quickly. We have modified this tool to remove capacity more slowly and added safeguards to prevent capacity from being removed when it will take any subsystem below its minimum required capacity level. This will prevent an incorrect input from triggering a similar event in the future. We are also auditing our other operational tools to ensure we have similar safety checks. We will also make changes to improve the recovery time of key S3 subsystems. (“Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region“)

How often do you see public lessons like this in security?

“We have modified our email clients to not display URLs which have friendly text that differs meaningfully from the underlying anchor. Additionally, we re-write URLs, and route them through our gateway unless they meet certain criteria…”

Relatedly, Etsy’s Debriefing Facilitation guide. Also, many people are describing this as “human error,” which reminds me of Don Norman’s “Proper Understanding of ‘The Human Factor’:”

…if a valve failed 75% of the time, would you get angry with the valve and simply continual to replace it? No, you might reconsider the design specs. You would try to figure out why the valve failed and solve the root cause of the problem. Maybe it is underspecified, maybe there shouldn’t be a valve there, maybe some change needs to be made in the systems that feed into the valve. Whatever the cause, you would find it and fix it. The same philosophy must
apply to people.

(Thanks to Steve Bellovin for reminding me of the Norman essay recently.)

Introducing Cyber Portfolio Management

At RSA’17, I spoke on “Security Leadership Lessons from the Dark Side.”

Leading a security program is hard. Fortunately, we can learn a great deal from Sith lords, including Darth Vader and how he managed security strategy for the Empire. Managing a distributed portfolio is hard when rebel scum and Jedi knights interfere with your every move. But that doesn’t mean that you have to throw the CEO into a reactor core. “Better ways you will learn, mmmm?”

In the talk, I discussed how “security people are from Mars and business people are from Wheaton,” and how to overcome the communication challenges associated with that.

RSA has posted audio with slides, and you can take a listen at the link above. If you prefer the written word, I have a small ebook on Cyber Portfolio Management, a new paradigm for driving effective security programs. But I designed the talk to be the most entertaining intro to the subject.

Later this week, I’ll be sharing the first draft of that book with people who subscribe to my “Adam’s New Thing” mailing list. Adam’s New Thing is my announcement list for people who hate such things. I guarantee that you’ll get fewer than 13 messages a year.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge that at BSides San Francisco 2012, Kellman Meghu made the point that “they’re having a pretty good risk management discussion,” and that inspired the way I kicked off this talk.

Calls for an NTSB?

In September, Steve Bellovin and I asked “Why Don’t We Have an Incident Repository?.”

I’m continuing to do research on the topic, and I’m interested in putting together a list of such things. I’d like to ask you for two favors.

First, if you remember such things, can you tell me about it? I recall “Computers at Risk,” the National Cyber Leap Year report, and the Bellovin & Neumann editorial in IEEE S&P. Oh, and “The New School of Information Security.” But I’m sure there have been others.

In particular, what I’m looking for are calls like this one in Computers at Risk (National Academies Press, 1991):

3a. Build a repository of incident data. The committee recommends that a repository of incident information be established for use in research, to increase public awareness of successful penetrations and existing vulnerabilities, and to assist security practitioners, who often have difficulty persuading managers to invest in security. This database should categorize, report, and track pertinent instances of system security-related threats, risks, and failures. […] One possible model for data collection is the incident reporting system administered by the National Transportation Safety Board… (chapter 3)

Second, I am trying to do searches such as “cites “Computers at Risk” and contains ‘NTSB’.” I have tried without luck to do this on Google Scholar, Microsoft Academic and Semantic Scholar. Only Google seems to be reliably identifying that report. Is there a good way to perform such a search?

Groundrules on Complaining About Security

Groundrules on Complaining About Security

In this article, I want to lead into some other articles I’m working on. In those, I’m going to complain about security. But I want those complaints to be thoughtful and within a proper context.

You will hear many of us in security talk about threat models. Adam literally wrote the book on threat models and if you don’t have a copy, you should get one.

Threat models are a way of thinking about security in a somewhat rigorous way. Without some sort of threat model, you’re not really doing security.

Threat models sound complex, but they’re really not. We all do them intuitively all the time, and here’s the basic outline of how to make one. You want answers to these questions:

  1. What are you doing?
  2. What could go wrong?
  3. What are you doing about it?

Among the valuable things in Adam’s book, he talks about these and more, but these three simple questions frame how to talk about security no matter who you are. If you don’t have a threat model, you might be doing something useful, but it’s not really security.

If you are a maker of security, without a threat model you might have a solution in search of a problem. You might also have a stone soup security system, in which you throw a bunch of things in a pot, and while tasty (or secure), isn’t organized. There are many, many stone soup security systems out there.

If you’re going to use a security system, without a threat model you have no way to know if what you’re getting meets your needs.

If you’re challenging a security system, without a threat model, your criticisms may be true but irrelevant.

It is these latter two cases – deciding what security system to you and providing a critique of a security system – that I’m going to focus on, particularly since I’m going to be engaging in challenges, and people selecting a system also need to think about what their own threat model is when selecting a system. If you’re going to use a secuity system, a little bit of thought about what you expect it to do and what you expect it to protect you from is in required.

Let me move a bit away from computer security for a moment; analogies often help.

Let’s look at this statement:

  • Aspirin doesn’t cure cancer.

It’s true. Aspirin doesn’t cure cancer. It doesn’t do half-bad on headaches (with of course, a number of other qualifiers), but it doesn’t cure cancer.

However, if Alice says, “I’m going to go take an aspirin” and Bob says, “Aspirin doesn’t cure cancer,” he has implicitly assumed that her threat model is not:

  • I have a headache
  • I’m going to take an aspirin to cure it

but

  • I have cancer
  • I’m going to take an aspirin to cure it.

Even if Alice actually does have cancer, she might also have a headache. Especially if she has to deal with someone with simplisitic thinking like Bob. This is the sort of headache that got me to write this essay.

Getting back to security, while I was typing the first part of this, a friend and I started on a discussion. We started with wondering if since most front door locks are easily picked, does that mean that they’re just security theatre. The discussion then went into social value of locks (most people are honest, after all), the technological merits of Abloy locks, the expense of getting a good lock for all your doors, the human factors aspects of wanting one key for all your doors, the security problem of weak points from the porch to the windows, and then on to reinforcing hinges and even the front door itself. It was a fun discussion, but it wasn’t a good security discussion, it was security stone soup. The initial question of whether most door locks do anything was the pot of water with a stone in it and we kept adding in garnishes until we ended up with a tasty conversation. However, at no point did we discuss a threat model. We don’t know what we were trying to protect, what threats we were protecting it from, or anything that turns it into a real security discussion.

I think we were talking about a stereotypical threat of a burglar backing up a van to the house and carting off a lot of valuables, but I am just presuming that.

I know of what I speak in this issue of threat models because I’m guilty of it, too. It’s so easy to get caught up in security stone soup that it happened to me while I was writing an essay on threat models and security stone soup.

Now that I have a couple of ground rules in place as a preface, I will complain about security in my next essay.

On Immigration and Refugees

NewImage Sergey Brin and baby
The ban on refugees is illegal, immoral and un-American, and as an American, I want to add my voice.

The ban is illegal. (“Trump’s Immigration Ban Is Illegal.”) I suspect that the United States also has legal obligations under treaties to accept refugees, but Google isn’t my lawyer, and I am no expert.

The ban is immoral. Those who have gone through our immigration process and gotten green cards are being restricted from returning to the US. Those people have followed the legal path to immigration and built lives here. We made a deal with them and we’re breaking it, suddenly and without warning. Those people might have jobs, school, or family to return to, and their lives are upended and uncertain. These are not illegal aliens, they are people who have gone through a complex, and sometimes kafka-esque immigration process.

I have worked with engineers from Syria. (I’m not going to name them in today’s climate.) They did good work, and were good people. They were dealing with the horror of hearing family back home was missing, and they did good work anyway.

The President is hurting America with this ban. By telling those here legally that their status can be upended at a whim, he makes a strong argument against coming here by following the rules as they exist on a given day. Some people will continue to come here in violation of the law; others will go elsewhere, and another country will get both the risk and the reward from that set of refugees.

It’s worth noting that the protests and court orders yesterday, while welcome, “Despite growing dissent, Trump gives no sign of backing down from travel ban.” I guess we need to keep calling this what it is: un-American.

Pictured is John von Neumann, refugee, and inventor of the von Neumann architecture that’s at the heart of the computer on which you’re reading this, and Sergey Brin, co-founder of Google, on his way to protest in San Francisco.

[Update: The hawks at Lawfare blog have an analysis, Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence:.]

2017 and Tidal Forces

There are two great blog posts at Securosis to kick off the new year:

Both are deep and important and worth pondering. I want to riff on something that Rich said:

On the security professional side I have trained hundreds of practitioners on cloud security, while working with dozens of organizations to secure cloud deployments. It can take years to fully update skills, and even longer to re-engineer enterprise operations, even without battling internal friction from large chunks of the workforce…

It’s worse than that. Yesterday Recently on Emergent Chaos, I talked about Red Queen Races, where you have to work harder and harder just to keep up.

In the pre-cloud world, you could fully update your skills. You could be an expert on Active Directory 2003, or Checkpoint’s Firewall-1. You could generate friction over moving to AD2012. You no longer have that luxury. Just this morning, Amazon launched a new rev of something. Google is pushing a new rev of its G-Suite to 5% of customers. Your skillset with the prior release is now out of date. (I have no idea if either really did this, but they could have.) Your skillset can no longer be a locked-in set of skills and knowledge. You need the meta-skills of modeling and learning. You need to understand what your model of AWS is, and you need to allocate time and energy to consciously learning about it.

That’s not just a change for individuals. It’s a change for how organizations plan for training, and it’s a change for how we should design training, as people will need lots more “what’s new in AWS in Q1 2017” training to augment “intro to AWS.”

Tidal forces, indeed.