There’s an interesting new paper at bioRXiv, “The Readability Of Scientific Texts Is Decreasing Over Time.”
Lower readability is also a problem for specialists (22, 23, 24). This was explicitly shown by Hartley (22) who demonstrated that rewriting scientific abstracts, to improve their readability, increased academics’ ability to comprehend them. While science is complex, and some jargon is unavoidable (25), this does not justify the continuing trend that we have shown.
Ironically, the paper is released as a PDF, which is hard to read on a mobile phone. There’s a tool, pandoc, which can easily create HTML versions from their LaTeX source. I encourage everyone who cares about their work being read to create HTML and ebook versions.
a fresh look at a 3700-year-old clay tablet suggests that Babylonian mathematicians not only developed the first trig table, beating the Greeks to the punch by more than 1000 years, but that they also figured out an entirely new way to look at the subject. However, other experts on the clay tablet, known as Plimpton 322 (P322), say the new work is speculative at best. (“This ancient Babylonian tablet may contain the first evidence of trigonometry.”)
The paper, “Plimpton 322 is Babylonian exact sexagesimal trigonometry” is short and open access, and also contains this gem:
If this interpretation is correct, then P322 replaces Hipparchus’ ‘table of chords’ as the world’s oldest trigonometric table — but it is additionally unique because of its exact nature, which would make it the world’s only completely accurate trigonometric table. These insights expose an entirely new level of sophistication for OB mathematics.
From his very first experiments, he could see that these animals were unrelated to jellyfish. In fact, they were profoundly different from any other animal on Earth.
Moroz reached this conclusion by testing the nerve cells of ctenophores for the neurotransmitters serotonin, dopamine and nitric oxide, chemical messengers considered the universal neural language of all animals. But try as he might, he could not find these molecules. The implications were profound.
Read “Aliens in our midst” at Aeon.
A study found that those who cycle have a net 41% lower risk of premature death. Now, when I read that headline my first thought was that it was 100 people over 6 months and a statistical fluke. But no, they followed a quarter million Britons for 5 years.
Now, it’s not obvious that it’s causal. Perhaps those who are healthier choose to ride to work? But it seems reasonable to assume that getting a bunch of exercise, fresh air, and adrenaline rushes as distracted drivers read their timeslines as they drive could lead to better health.
The paper is “Association between active commuting and incident cardiovascular disease, cancer, and mortality: prospective cohort study,” and a press discussion is at “Cycling to work may cut your risk of premature death by 40%.”
Photo by Jack Alexander.
That’s the subtitle of a new paper by Cormac Herley and Paul van Oorschot, “SoK: Science, Security, and the Elusive Goal of Security as a Scientific Pursuit,” forthcoming in IEEE Security & Privacy.
The past ten years has seen increasing calls to make security research more “scientific”. On the surface, most agree that this is desirable, given universal recognition of “science” as a positive force. However, we find that there is little clarity on what “scientific” means in the context of computer security research, or consensus on what a “Science of Security” should look like. We selectively review work in the history and philosophy of science and more recent work under the label “Science of Security”. We explore what has been done under the theme of relating science and security, put this in context with historical science, and offer observations and insights we hope may motivate further exploration and guidance. Among our findings are that practices on which the rest of science has reached consensus appear little used or recognized in security, and a pattern of methodological errors continues unaddressed.
There’s a new paper from Mark Thompson and Hassan Takabi of the University of North Texas. The title captures the question:
Effectiveness Of Using Card Games To Teach Threat Modeling For Secure Web Application Developments
Gamification of classroom assignments and online tools has grown significantly in recent years. There have been a number of card games designed for teaching various cybersecurity concepts. However, effectiveness of these card games is unknown for the most part and there is no study on evaluating their effectiveness. In this paper, we evaluate effectiveness of one such game, namely the OWASP Cornucopia card game which is designed to assist software development teams identify security requirements in Agile, conventional and formal development
processes. We performed an experiment where sections of graduate students and undergraduate students in a security related course at our university were split into two groups, one of which played the Cornucopia card game, and one of which did not. Quizzes were administered both before and after the activity, and a survey was taken to measure student attitudes toward the exercise. The results show that while students found the activity useful and would like to see this activity and more similar exercises integrated into the classroom, the game was not easy to understand. We need to spend enough time to familiarize the students with the game and prepare them for the exercises using the game to get the best results.
I’m very glad to see games like Cornucopia evaluated. If we’re going to push the use of Cornucopia (or Elevation of Privilege) for teaching, then we ought to be thinking about how well they work in comparison to other techniques. We have anecdotes, but to improve, we must test and measure.
Over the decade or so since The New School book came out, there’s been a sea change in how we talk about breaches, and how we talk about those who got breached. We agree that understanding what’s going wrong should be a bigger part of how we learn. I’m pleased to have played some part in that movement.
As I consider where we are today, a question that we can’t answer sufficiently is “what’s in it for me?” “Why should I spend time on this?” The benefits may take too long to appear. And so we should ask what we could do about that. In that context, I am very excited to see a proposal from Rob Knake on “Creating a Federally Sponsored Cyber Insurance Program.”
He suggests that a full root cause analysis would be a condition of Federal insurance backstop:
The federally backstopped cyber insurance program should mandate that companies allow full breach investigations, which include on-site gathering of data on why the attack succeeded, to help other companies prevent similar attacks. This function would be similar to that performed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for aviation incidents. When an incident occurs, the NTSB establishes the facts of the incident and makes recommendations to prevent similar incidents from occurring. Although regulators typically establish new requirements upon the basis of NTSB recommendations, most air carriers implement recommendations on a voluntary basis. Such a virtuous cycle could happen in cybersecurity if companies covered by a federal cyber insurance program had their incidents investigated by a new NTSB-like entity, which could be run by the private sector and funded by insurance companies.
Steve Bellovin and I provided some “Input to the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity.” It opens:
We are writing after 25 years of calls for a “NTSB for Security” have failed to result in action. As early as 1991, a National Research Council report called for “build[ing] a repository of incident data” and said “one possible model for data collection is the incident reporting system administered by the National Transportation Safety Board.”  The calls for more data about incidents have continued, including by us [2, 3].
The lack of a repository of incident data impacts our ability to answer or assess many of your questions, and our key recommendation is that the failure to establish such a repository is, in and of itself, worthy of study. There are many factors in the realm of folklore as to why we do not have a repository, but no rigorous answer. Thus, our answer to your question 4 (“What can or should be done now or within the next 1-2 years to better address the challenges?”) is to study what factors have inhibited the creation of a repository of incident data, and our answer to question 5 (“what should be done over a decade?”) is to establish one. Commercial air travel is so incredibly safe today precisely because of decades of accident investigations, investigations that have helped plane manufacturers, airlines, and pilots learn from previous failures.
At the RMS blog, we learn they are “Launching a New Journal for Terrorism and Cyber Insurance:”
Natural hazard science is commonly studied at college, and to some level in the insurance industry’s further education and training courses. But this is not the case with terrorism risk. Even if insurance professionals learn about terrorism in the course of their daily business, as they move into other positions, their successors may begin with hardly any technical familiarity with terrorism risk. It is not surprising therefore that, even fifteen years after 9/11, knowledge and understanding of terrorism insurance risk modeling across the industry is still relatively low.
There is no shortage of literature on terrorism, but much has a qualitative geopolitical and international relations focus, and little is directly relevant to terrorism insurance underwriting or risk management.
This is particularly exciting as Gordon Woo was recommended to me as the person to read on insurance math in new fields. His Calculating Catastrophe is comprehensive and deep.
It will be interesting to see who they bring aboard to complement the very strong terrorism risk team on the cyber side.
“Better safe than sorry” are the closing words in a NYT story, “A Colorado Town Tests Positive for Marijuana (in Its Water).”
Now, I’m in favor of safety, and there’s a tradeoff being made. Shutting down a well reduces safety by limiting the supply of water, and in this case, they closed a pool, which makes it harder to stay cool in 95 degree weather.
At Wired, Nick Stockton does some math, and says “IT WOULD TAKE A LOT OF THC TO CONTAMINATE A WATER SUPPLY.” (Shouting theirs.)
High-potency THC extract is pretty expensive. One hundred dollars for a gram of the stuff is not an unreasonable price. If this was an accident, it was an expensive one. If this was a prank, it was a financed by Bill Gates…Remember, the highest concentration of THC you can physically get in a liter of water is 3 milligrams.
Better safe than sorry is a tradeoff, and we should talk about it ask such.
Even without drinking the, ummm, kool-aid, this doesn’t pass the giggle test.