Larry Greenblat is releasing a series of videos titled “Passing the CISSP Exam with the help of Spock & Kirk.” I, of course, love this, because using stories to help people learn and remember is awesome, and it reminds me of my own “The Security Principles of Saltzer and Schroeder, illustrated with Star Wars.” Also, my thoughts on Star Wars vs Star Trek for these sorts of things.
In a memo issued Jan. 4 and rescinded about an hour later, Deputy Defense Secretary Pat Shanahan announced a new “Central Cloud Computing Program Office” — or “C3PO” — to “acquire the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud.”
“C3PO is authorized to obligate funds as necessary in support of the JEDI Cloud,” Shanahan, a former Boeing Co. executive, wrote, managing to get a beloved droid from the space-themed movies and an equally popular fictional order of warriors into what otherwise would be a routine message in the Pentagon bureaucracy.
The memo was recalled because “it was issued in error,” according to Shanahan’s spokesman, Navy Captain Jeff Davis.
Thanks to MC for the story.
[Updated with a leaked copy of the response from Imperial Security.]
To: Grand Moff Tarkin
Re: “The Pentesters Strike Back” memo
Classification: Imperial Secret/Attorney Directed Work Product
We have received and analyzed the “Pentesters Strike Back” video, created by Kessel Cyber Security Consulting, in support of their report 05.25.1977. This memo analyzes the video, presents internal analysis, and offers strategies for response to the Trade Federation.
In short, this is typical pen test slagging of our operational security investments, which meet or exceed all best practices. It is likely just a negotiating tactic, albeit one with catchy music.
Finding 1.3: “Endpoints unprotected against spoofing.” This is true, depending on a certain point of view. Following the execution of Order 66, standing policy has been “The Jedi are extinct. Their fire has gone out of the universe.” As such, Stormtrooper training has been optimized to improve small arms accuracy, which has been a perennial issue identified in after-action reports.
Finding 2.1: “Network Segmentation inadequate.” This has been raised repeatedly by internal audit, perhaps this would be a good “area for improvement” in response to this memo.
Finding 4.2: “Data at rest not encrypted.” This is inaccurate. The GalactiCAD server in question was accessed from an authorized endpoint. As such, it decrypted the data, and sent it over an encrypted tunnel to the endpoint. The pen testers misunderstand our network architecture, again.
Finding 5.1: “Physical access not controlled.” Frankly, sir, this battle station is the ultimate power in the universe. It has multiple layers of physical access control, including the screening units of Star Destroyers and Super SDs, Tie Fighters, Storm Trooper squadrons in each landing bay, [Top Secret-1], and [Top Secret-2]. Again, the pen testers ignore facts to present “findings” to their clients.
Finding 5.2: “Unauthorized mobile devices allows network access.” This is flat-out wrong. In the clip presented, TK-427 is clearly heard authorizing the droids in question. An audit of our records indicate that both driods presented authorization certificates signed by Lord Vader’s certificate authority. As you know, this CA has been the source of some dispute over time, but the finding presented is, again, simply wrong.
Finding 8.3: “Legacy intruder-tracking system inadequately concealed.” Again, this claim simply has no basis in fact. The intruder-tracking system worked perfectly, allowing the Imperial Fleet to track the freighter to Yavin. In analyzing the video, we expect that General Orgena’s intuition was “Force”-aided.
In summary, there are a few minor issues identified which require attention. However, the bulk of the report presents mis-understandings, unreasonable expectations, and focuses heavily on a set of assumptions that just don’t bear up to scrutiny. We are in effective compliance with PCI-DSS, this test did not reveal a single credit card number, and the deal with the Trade Federation should not be impeded.
Via Bruce Schneier.
It’s time for some Friday Star Wars blogging!
Reverend Robert Ballecer, SJ tweeted: “as a child I learned a few switches & 4 numbers gives you remote code ex on a 23rd century starship.” I responded, asking “When attackers are on the bridge and can flip switches, how long a password do you think is appropriate?”
It went from there, but I’d like to take this opportunity to propose a partial threat model for 23rd century starships.
First, a few assumptions:
- Sometimes, officers and crewmembers of starships die, are taken prisoner, or are otherwise unable to complete their duties.
- It is important that the crew can control the spaceship, including software and computer hardware.
- Unrestricted physical access to the bridge means you control the ship (with possible special cases, and of course, the Holodeck because lord forgive me, they need to shoot a show every week. Scalzi managed to get a surprisingly large amount from this line of inquiry in Red Shirts. But I digress.)
I’ll also go so far as to say that as a derivative of the assumptions, the crew may need a rapid way to assign “Captain” privileges to someone else, and starship designers should be careful to design for that use case.
So the competing threats here are denial of service (and possibly denial of future service) and elevation of privilege. There’s a tension between designing for availability (anyone on the bridge can assume command relatively easily) and proper authorization. My take was that the attackers on the bridge are already close to winning, and so defenses which impede replacing command authority are a mistake.
Now, in responding, I thought that “flipping switches” meant physically being there, because I don’t recall the episode that he’s discussing. But further in further conversation, what became clear is that the switches can be flipped remotely, which dramatically alters the need for a defense.
It’s not clear what non-dramatic requirement such remote switch flipping serves, and so on balance, it’s easy to declare that the added risk is high and we should not have remote switch flipping. It is always easy to declare that the risk is high, but here I have the advantage that there’s no real product designer in the room arguing for the feature. If there was, we would clarify the requirement, and then probably engineer some appropriate defenses, such as exponential backoff for remote connections. Of course, in the future with layers of virtualization, what a remote connection is may be tricky to determine in software.
Which brings me to another tweet, by Hongyi Hu, who said he was “disappointed that they still use passwords for authentication in the 23rd century. I hope the long tail isn’t that long! 😛” What can I say but, “we’ll always have passwords.” We’ll just use them for less.
As I’ve discussed, the reason I use Star Wars over Star Trek in my teaching and examples is that no one is confused about the story in the core movies. I made precisely this mistake.
Image: The Spaceship Discovery, rendered by Trekkie5000. Alert readers will recall issues that could have been discovered with better threat modeling.
IANS members should have access today to a new faculty report I wrote, entitled “Threat Modeling in An Agile World.” Because it’s May the Fourth, I thought I’d share the opening:
As Star Wars reaches its climax, an aide approaches Grand Moff Tarkin to say, “We’ve analyzed their attack pattern, and there is a danger.” In one of the final decisions he makes, Tarkin brushes aside those concerns. Likewise, in Rogue One, we hear Galen Urso proclaim that the flaw is too subtle to be found. But that’s bunk. There’s clearly no blow-out sections or baffles around the reactor: if there’s a problem, the station is toast. A first year engineering student could catch it.
You don’t have to be building a Death Star to think about what might go wrong before you complete the project. The way we do that is by “threat modeling,” an umbrella term for anticipating and changing the problems that a system might experience. Unfortunately, a lot of the advice you’ll hear about threat modeling makes it seem a little bit like the multi-year process of building a Death Star.
This post has spoilers for Rogue One, and also Return of the Jedi.
Then the Death Star is tested, destroying Jedah, where they’re mining the crystals. Note that both times its fired, they give the order “single reactor ignition.” Are they testing the reactors and power systems, or conserving kyber crystal?
Really, how much “ammo” did the original Death Star have on board? How many times could they fire the main gun?
Was ten or fifteen shots considered sufficient, because after a demonstration, fear will keep the local systems in line? Where did they find enought kyber crystal for the second Death Star?
There’s some really interesting leaked photos and analysis by Charles Goodman. “Leaked photos from the Rogue One sequel (Mainly Speculation – Possible Spoilers).”
Someone once asked me why I like Star Wars more than Star Trek. I was a bit taken aback, and he assumed that since I use it so much, I obviously prefer it. The real reason I use Star Wars is not that it’s better, but that there’s a small canon, and I don’t have to interrupt the flow of a talk to explain the scene where Darth Vader is strangling someone. But let’s face it, Star Trek was often better as science fiction. There are four or five bright lights that rank up there as some of the very best storytelling of the last few decades.
Trek at its most poignant was a transparent mirror to the world. The original series commented on Vietnam and race repeatedly in ways which let people see another way of looking at a situation. Moral nuance is easier to see when the ox being gored isn’t yours.
Rogue One is the first Star Wars with moral complexity. If you haven’t seen it, I find your lack of faith…disturbing. But when there’s a guy who cost you your limbs, your children, and threw the galaxy into civil war, throwing him in the reactor core isn’t a very complex choice. In fact, the whole “dark side” is a bit of a giveaway. In case you miss that, the Jedi were guardians of peace and justice throughout the galaxy. Are we clear yet? No? How about the Nazi uniforms? I could go on, but we’re gonna get to spoilers. My point is, the first four films were great action movies. Maybe we’ll see some moral complexity when someone finally gets around to filming the tragic fall of Anakin Skywalker, reputedly the core story of I-III. But I’m betting they’ll be action movies with talking teddy bears for the kids.
Speaking of morality, if you’re just now noticing that your political world resembles the Empire’s, or if you’re angry that the script seems to mock your party…maybe you should look at your world through that mirror and ask if you’re on the right side of morality or history. After all, that’s what makes for great science fiction. The opportunity to see the world through a new lens. And the fact is, the story was not substantially re-written. “Rogue One’s Discarded Dialog” and See 46 shots that were cut from Rogue One” show a story with a little less character, a little more army, but not a sympathetic, racially and species-diverse Empire. The movie wasn’t re-written as a commentary on 2016.
Structurally, Rogue One is a war story, not an action story. It’s not about the hero’s journey, or Luke growing up. It’s a story about the chaos that follows a civil war, and it’s messy and has characters who make choices from a set of bad options.
When Cassian shoots the fellow so he can escape at the start? Galen Erso’s decision to work on the Death Star, delay it, and insert a flaw (or two?) These are perhaps the wrong choices in bad situations. We don’t see why Saw Gerrera and the Rebel Alliance split. We see the Rebellion at its worst — unable to take action in the face of imminent destruction, and then impulsively chasing Rogue One into battle. (What Rogue One Teaches Us About the Rebel Alliance’s Military Chops is a great dissection of this.)
But we can look to Galen Erso’s decision to work on the Death Star, and have a conversation about what he should have done. Gone to a labor camp and let someone else build it with a better reactor core? What if that someone else had put more shielding over the thermal exhaust ports? (Speaking of which, don’t miss “The Death Star Architect Speaks Out,” and perhaps even my commentary, “Governance Lessons from the Death Star Architect.” I think the governance questions are even more interesting now, if the Empire were to conduct a blameless post mortem, but we know they don’t.) We can use that decision to talk, abstractly, about taking a job in the Trump Administration with less of the horrible emotional weight that that carries.
That mirror on the world is what great science fiction offers us, and that’s what makes Rouge One the best Star Wars yet.
C-3PO: Sir, the possibility of successfully navigating an asteroid field is approximately 3,720 to 1.
Han Solo: Never tell me the odds.
I was planning to start this with a C-3PO quote, and then move to a discussion of risk and risk taking. But I had forgotten just how rich a vein George Lucas tapped into with 3PO’s lines in The Empire Strikes Back. So I’m going to talk about his performance prior to being encouraged to find a non-front-line role with the Rebellion.
In case you need a refresher on the plot, having just about run out of options, Han Solo decides to take the known, high risk of flying into an asteroid field. When he does, 3PO interrupts to provide absolutely useless information. There’s nothing about how to mitigate the risk (except surrendering to the Empire). There’s nothing about alternatives. Then 3PO pipes up to inform people that he was previously wrong:
C-3PO: Artoo says that the chances of survival are 725 to 1. Actually Artoo has been known to make mistakes… from time to time… Oh dear…
I have to ask: How useless is that? “My first estimate was off by a factor of 5, you should trust this new one?”
C-3PO: I really don’t see how that is going to help! Surrender is a perfectly acceptable alternative in extreme circumstances! The Empire may be gracious enough to… [Han signals to Leia, who shuts 3PO down.]
Most of the time, being shut down in a meeting isn’t this extreme. But there’s a point in a discussion, especially in high-pressure situations, where the best contribution is silence. There’s a point at which talking about the wrong thing at the wrong time can cost credibility that you’d need later. And while the echo in the dialogue is for comic effect, the response certainly contains a lesson for us all:
C-3PO: The odds of successfully surviving an attack on an Imperial Star Destroyer are approximately…Leia: Shut up!
And the eventual outcome:
C-3PO: Sir, If I may venture an opinion…Han Solo: I’m not really interested in your opinion 3PO.
Does C-3PO resemble any CSOs you know? Any meetings you’ve been in? Successful business people are excellent at thinking about risk. Everything from launching a business to hiring employees to launching a new product line involves risk tradeoffs. The good business people either balance those risks well, or they transfer them away in some way (ideally, ethically). What they don’t want or need is some squeaky-voiced robot telling them that they don’t understand risk.
So don’t be C-3PO. Provide useful input at useful times, with useful options.
Originally appeared in Dark Reading, “Security Lessons from C-3PO, Former CSO of the Millennium Falcon,” as part of a series I’m doing there, “security lessons from..”. So far in the series, lessons from: my car mechanic, my doctor, The Gluten Lie, and my stock broker.
Offered up without comment: