The Dope Cycle and a Deep Breath

Back in January, I wrote about “The Dope Cycle and the Two Minutes Hate.” In that post, I talked about:

Not kidding: even when you know you’re being manipulated into wanting it, you want it. And you are being manipulated, make no mistake. Site designers are working to make your use of their site as pleasurable as possible, as emotionally engaging as possible. They’re caught up in a Red Queen Race, where they must engage faster and faster just to stay in place. And when you’re in such a race, it helps to steal as much as you can from millions of years of evolution. [Edit: I should add that this is not a moral judgement on the companies or the people, but rather an observation on what they must do to survive.] That’s dopamine, that’s adrenaline, that’s every hormone that’s been covered in Popular Psychology. It’s a dope cycle, and you can read that in every sense of the word dope.

I just discovered a fascinating tool from a company called Dopamine Labs. Dopamine Labs is a company that helps their corporate customers drive engagement: “Apps use advanced software tools that shape and control user behavior. We know because [we sell] it to them.” They’ve released a tool called Space: “Space uses neuroscience and AI to help you kick app addiction. No shame. No sponsors. Just a little breathing room to help you take back control.” As they say: “It’s the same math that we use to get people addicted to apps, just run backwards.”

Space app
There are some fascinating ethical questions involved in selling both windows and bricks. I’m going to say that you participants in a red queen race might as well learn what countermeasures to their techniques are by building them. Space works as a Chrome plugin and as an iOS and Android App. I’ve installed it, and I like it more than I like another tool I’ve been using (Dayboard). I really like Dayboard’s todo list, but feel that it cuts me off in the midst of time wasting, rather than walking me away.)

The app is at

As we go into big conferences, it might be worth installing. (Also as we head into conferences, be excellent to each other. Know and respect your limits and those of others. Assume good intent. Avoid getting pulled into a “Drama Triangle.”)

Adam & Chris Wysopal webcast

(Today) Wednesday, May 24th, 2017 at 1:00 PM EDT (17:00:00 UTC), Chris Wysopal and I are doing a SANS webcast, “Choosing the Right Path to Application Security.” I’m looking forward to it, and hope you can join us!

Update: the webcast is now archived, and the white paper associated with it, “Using Cloud Deployment to Jump-Start Application Security,” is in the SANS reading room.

What does the MS Secure Boot Issue teach us about key escrow?


No, seriously. Articles like “Microsoft Secure Boot key debacle causes security panic” and “Bungling Microsoft singlehandedly proves that golden backdoor keys are a terrible idea” draw on words in an advisory to say that this is all about golden keys and secure boot. This post is not intended to attack anyone; researchers, journalists or Microsoft, but to address a rather inflammatory claim that’s being repeated.

Based on my read of a advisory copy (which I made because I cannot read words on an animated background (yes, I’m a grumpy old man (who uses too many parentheticals (especially when I’m sick)))), this is a nice discovery of an authorization failure.

What they found is:

The “supplemental” policy contains new elements, for the merging conditions. These conditions are (well, at one time) unchecked by bootmgr when loading a legacy policy. And bootmgr of win10 v1511 and earlier certainly doesn’t know about them. To those bootmgrs, it has just loaded in a perfectly valid, signed policy. The “supplemental” policy does NOT contain a DeviceID. And, because they were meant to be merged into a base policy, they don’t contain any BCD rules either, which means that if they are loaded, you can enable testsigning.

That’s a fine discovery and a nice vuln. There are ways Microsoft might have designed this better, I’m going to leave those for another day.

Where the post goes off the rails, in my view, is this:

About the FBI: are you reading this? If you are, then this is a perfect real world example about why your idea of backdooring cryptosystems with a “secure golden key” is very bad! Smarter people than me have been telling this to you for so long, it seems you have your fingers in your ears. You seriously don’t understand still? Microsoft implemented a “secure golden key” system.[1] And the golden keys got released from MS own stupidity.[2] Now, what happens if you tell everyone to make a “secure golden key” system? [3] (Bracketed numbers added – Adam)

So, [1], no they did not. [2] No it didn’t. [3] Even a stopped clock …

You could design a system in which there’s a master key, and accidentally release that key. Based on the advisory, Microsoft has not done that. (I have not talked to anyone at MS about this issue; I might have talked to people about the overall design, but don’t recall having done so.) What this is is an authorization system with a design flaw. As far as I can tell, no keys have been released.

Look, there are excellent reasons to not design a “golden key” system. I talked about them at a fundamental engineering level in my threat modeling book, and posted the excerpt in “Threat Modeling Crypto Back Doors.”

The typical way the phrase “golden key” is used (albiet fuzzily) is that there is a golden key which unlocks communications. That is a bad idea. This is not that, and we as engineers or advocates should not undercut our position on that bad idea by referring to this research as if it really impacts on that “debate.”

Open Letters to Security Vendors

John Masserini has a set of “open letters to security vendors” on Security Current.

Everyone involved in product or sales at a security startup should read them. John provides insight into what it’s like to be pitched by too many startups, and provides a level of transparency that’s sadly hard to find. Personally, I learned a great deal about what happens when you’re pitched while I was at a large company, and I can vouch for the realities he puts forth. The sooner you understand those realities and incorporate them into your thinking, the more successful we’ll all be.

After meeting with dozens of startups at Black Hat a few weeks ago, I’ve realized that the vast majority of the leaders of these new companies struggle to articulate the value their solutions bring to the enterprise.

Why does John’s advice make us all more successful? Because each organization that follows it moves towards a more efficient state, for themselves and for the folks who they’re pitching.

Getting more efficient means you waste less time per prospect. When you focus on qualified leads who care about the problem you’re working on, you get more sales per unit of time. What’s more, by not wasting the time of those who won’t buy, you free up their time for talking to those who might have something to provide them. (One banker I know said “I could hire someone full-time to reject startup pitches.” Think about what that means for your sales cycle for a moment.)

Go read “An Open Letter to Security Vendors” along with part 2 (why sales takes longer) and part 3 (the technology challenges most startups ignore).

The Evolution of Secure Things

One of the most interesting security books I’ve read in a while barely mentions computers or security. The book is Petroski’s The Evolution of Useful Things.

Evolution Of useful Things Book Cover

As the subtitle explains, the book discusses “How Everyday Artifacts – From Forks and Pins to Paper Clips and Zippers – Came to be as They are.”

The chapter on the fork is a fine example of the construction of the book.. The book traces its evolution from a two-tined tool useful for holding meat as it was cut to the 4 tines we have today. Petroski documents the many variants of forks which were created, and how each was created with reference to the perceived failings of previous designs. The first designs were useful for holding meat as you cut it, before transferring it to your mouth with the knife. Later designs were unable to hold peas, extract an oyster, cut pastry, or meet a variety of other goals that diners had. Those goals acted as evolutionary pressures, and drove innovators to create new forms of the fork.

Not speaking of the fork, but rather of newer devices, Petroski writes:

Why designers do not get things right the first time may be more understandable than excusable. Whether electronics designers pay less attention to how their devices will be operated, or whether their familiarity with the electronic guts of their own little monsters hardens them against these monsters’ facial expressions, there is a consensus among consumers and reflective critics like Donald Norman, who has characterized “usable design” as the “next competitive frontier,” that things seldom live up to their promise. Norman states flatly, “Warning labels and large instruction manuals are signs of failures, attempts to patch up problems that should have been avoided by proper design in the first place.” He is correct, of course, but how is it that designers have, almost to a person, been so myopic?

So what does this have to do with security?

(No, it’s not “stick a fork in it, it’s done fer.”)

Its a matter of the pressures brought to bear on the designs of even what (we now see) as the very simplest technologies. It’s about the constant imperfection of products, and how engineering is a response to perceived imperfections. It’s about the chaotic real world from which progress emerges. In a sense, products are never perfected, but express tradeoffs between many pressures, like manufacturing techniques, available materials, and fashion in both superficial and deep ways.

In security, we ask for perfection against an ill-defined and ever-growing list of hard-to-understand properties, such as “double-free safety.”

Computer security is in a process of moving from expressing “security” to expressing more precise goals, and the evolution of useful tools for finding, naming, and discussing vulnerabilities will help us express what we want in secure software.

The various manifestations of failure, as have been articulated in case studies throughout this book, provide the conceptual underpinning for understanding the evolving form of artifacts and the fabric of technology into which they are inextricably woven. It is clearly the perception of failure in existing technology that drives inventors, designers, and engineers to modify what others may find perfectly adequate, or at least usable. What constitutes failure and what improvement is not totally objective, for in the final analysis a considerable list of criteria, ranging from the functional to the aesthetic, from the economic to the moral, can come into play. Nevertheless, each criterion must be judged in a context of failure, which, though perhaps much easier than success to quantify, will always retain an aspect of subjectivity. The spectrum of subjectivity may appear to narrow to a band of objectivity within the confines of disciplinary discussion, but when a diversity of individuals and groups comes together to discuss criteria of success and failure, consensus can be an elusive state.

Even if you’ve previously read it, re-reading it from a infosec perspective is worthwhile. Highly recommended.

[As I was writing this, Ben Hughes wrote a closely related post on the practical importance of tradeoffs, “A Dockery of a Sham.”]

Towards a model of web browser security

One of the values of models is they can help us engage in areas where otherwise the detail is overwhelming. For example, C is a model of how a CPU works that allows engineers to defer certain details to the compiler, rather than writing in assembler. It empowers software developers to write for many CPU architectures at once. Many security flaws happen in areas the models simplify. For example, what if the stack grew away from the stack pointer, rather than towards it? The layout of the stack is a detail that is modeled away.

Information security is a broad industry, requiring and rewarding specialization. We often see intense specialization, which can naturally result in building expertise in silos, and tribal separation of knowledge create more gaps. At the same time, there is a stereotype that generalists end up focused on policy, or “risk management” where a lack of technical depth can hide. (That’s not to say that all risk managers are generalists or that there’s not real technical depth to some of them.)

If we want to enable more security generalists, and we want those generalists to remain grounded, we need to make it easier to learn about new areas. Part of that is good models, part of that is good exercises that appropriately balance challenge to skill level, part of that is the availability of mentoring, and I’m sure there are other parts I’m missing.

I enjoyed many things about Michael Zalewski’s book “The Tangled Web.” One thing I wanted was a better way to keep track of who attacks whom, to help me contextualize and remember the attacks. But such a model is not trivial to create. This morning, motivated by a conversation between Trey Ford and Chris Rohlf, I decided to take a stab at drafting a model for thinking about where the trust boundaries exist.

The words which open my threat modeling book are “all models are wrong, some models are useful.” I would appreciate feedback on this model. What’s missing, and why does it matter? What attacks require showing a new element in this software model?

Browser security
[Update 1 — please leave comments here, not on Twitter]

  1. Fabio Cerullo suggests the layout engine. It’s not clear to me what additional threats can be seen if you add this explicitly, perhaps because I’m not an expert.
  2. Fernando Montenegro asks about network services such as DNS, which I’m adding and also about shared trust (CA Certs), which overlap with a question about supply chain from Mayer Sharma.
  3. Chris Rohlf points out the “web browser protection profile.

I could be convinced otherwise, but think that the supply chain is best addressed by a separate model. Having a secure installation and update mechanism is an important mitigation of many types of bugs, but this model is for thinking about the boundaries between the components.

In reviewing the protection profile, it mentions the following threats:

Threat Comment
Malicious updates Out of scope (supply chain)
Malicious/flawed add on Out of scope (supply chain)
Network eavesdropping/attack Not showing all the data flows for simplicity (is this the right call?)
Data access Local storage is shown

Also, the protection profile is 88 pages long, and hard to engage with. While it provides far more detail and allows me to cross-check the software model, it doesn’t help me think about interactions between components.

End update 1]

Wassenaar Restrictions on Speech

[There are broader critiques by Katie Moussouris of HackerOne at “Legally Blind and Deaf – How Computer Crime Laws Silence Helpful Hackers” and Halvar Flake at “Why changes to Wassenaar make oppression and surveillance easier, not harder.” This post addresses the free speech issue.]

During the first crypto wars, cryptography was regulated under the US ITAR regulations as a dual use item, and to export strong crypto (and thus, economically to include it in a generally available commercial or open source product) was effectively impossible.

A principle of our successful work to overcome those restrictions was that code is speech. Thus restrictions on code are restrictions on speech. The legal incoherence of the regulations was brought to an unavoidable crises by Phil Karn, who submitted both the book Applied Cryptography and a floppy disk with the source code from the book for an export license. The book received a license, the disk did not. This was obviously incoherent and Kafka-esque. At the time, American acceptance of incoherent, Kafka-esque rules was in much shorter supply.

Now, the new Wassenaar rules appear to contain restrictions on the export of a different type of code (page 209, category 4, see after the jump). (FX drew attention to this issue in this tweet. [Apparently, I wrote this in Jan, 2014, and forgot to hit post.])

A principle of our work was that code is speech. Thus restrictions on code are restrictions on speech. (Stop me if you’ve heard this one before.) I put forth several tweets that contain PoC I was able to type from memory, each of which, I believe, in principle, could violate the Wassenaar rules. For example:

  • rlogin -froot $target
  • echo wiz | nc $target 25

It would be nice if someone would file for the paperwork to export them on paper.

In this tweet, I’m not speaking for my employer or yours. I am speaking for poor, tired and hungry cryptographers, yearning to breathe free, and to not live on groundhog day.

Continue reading “Wassenaar Restrictions on Speech”

Microsoft Backs Laws Forbidding Windows Use By Foreigners

According to Groklaw, Microsoft is backing laws that forbid the use of Windows outside of the US. Groklaw doesn’t say that directly. Actually, they pose charmingly with the back of the hand to the forehead, bending backwards dramatically and asking, “ Why Is Microsoft Seeking New State Laws That Allow it to Sue Competitors For Piracy by Overseas Suppliers? ” Why, why, why, o why, they ask.

The headline of this article is the obvious reason. Microsoft might not know they’re doing it for that reason. Usually, people with the need to do something, dammit because they fear they might be headed to irrelevancy think of something and follow the old Aristotelian syllogism:

Something must be done.
This is something.
Therefore, it must be done.

It’s pure logic, you know. This is exactly how Britney Spears ended up with Laurie Anderson’s haircut and the US got into policing China’s borders. It’s logical, and as an old colleague used to say with a sigh, “There’s no arguing with logic like that.”

Come on, let’s look at what happens. I run a business, and there’s a law that says that if my overseas partners aren’t paying for their Microsoft software, then Microsoft can sue me, what do I do?

Exactly right. I put a clause in the contract that says that they agree not to use any Microsoft software. Duh. That way, if they haven’t paid their Microsoft licenses, I can say, “O, you bad, naughty business partner. You are in breach of our contract! I demand that you immediately stop using Microsoft stuff, or I shall move you from being paid net 30 to net 45 at contract renegotiation time!” End of problem.

And hey, some of my partners will actually use something other than Windows. At least for a few days, until they realize how badly Open Office sucks.

Use crypto. Not too confusing. Mostly asymmetric.

A little ways back, Gunnar Peterson said “passwords are like hamburgers, taste great but kill us in long run wean off password now or colonoscopy later.” I responded: “Use crypto. Not too confusing. Mostly asymmetric.” I’d like to expand on that a little. Not quite so much as Michael Pollan, but a little.

The first sentence, “use crypto” is a simple one. It means more security requires getting away from sending strings as a way to authenticate people at a distance. This applies (obviously) to passwords, but also to SSNs, mother’s “maiden” names, your first car, and will apply to biometrics. Sending a string which represents an image of a fingerprint is no harder to fake than sending a password. Stronger authenticators will need to involve an algorithm and a key.

The second, “not too confusing” is a little more subtle, because there are layers of confusing. There’s developer confusion as the system is implemented, adding pieces, like captchas, without a threat model. There’s user confusion as to what program popped that demand for credentials, what site they’re connecting to, or what password they’re supposed to use. There’s also confusion about what makes a good password when one site demands no fewer than 10 characters and another insists on no more. But regardless, it’s essential that a a strong authentication system be understood by at least 99% of its users, and that the authentication is either mutual or resistant to replay, reflection and man-in-the-middle attacks. In this, “TOFU” is better than PKI. I prefer to call TOFO “persistence” or “key persistence” This is in keeping with Pollan’s belief that things with names are better than things with acronyms.

Finally, “mostly asymmetric.” There are three main building blocks in crypto. They are one way functions, symmetric and asymmetric ciphers. Asymmetric systems are those with two mathematically related keys, only one of which is kept secret. These are better because forgery attacks are harder; because only one party holds a given key. (Systems that use one way functions can also deliver this property.) There are a few reasons to avoid asymmetric ciphers, mostly having to do with the compute capabilities of really small devices like a smartcard or very power limited devices like pacemakers.

So there you have it: Use crypto. Not too confusing. Mostly asymmetric.