Category: National ID

Shocking News of the Day: Social Security Numbers Suck

The firm’s annual Banking Identity Safety Scorecard looked at the consumer-security practices of 25 large banks and credit unions. It found that far too many still rely on customers’ Social Security numbers for authentication purposes — for instance, to verify a customer’s identity when he or she wants to speak to a bank representative over the telephone or re-set a password.

All banks in the report used some version of the Social Security number as a means of authenticating the customer, Javelin found. The pervasive use of Social Security numbers was surprising, given the importance of Social Security numbers as a tool for identity theft, said Phil Blank, managing director of security, risk and fraud at Javelin. (“Banks Rely Too Heavily On Social Security Numbers, Report Finds“, Ann Carrns, New York Times)

Previously here: “Social Security Numbers are Worthless as Authenticators” (2009), or “Bad advice on SSNs” (2005).

Nymwars: Thoughts on Google+

There’s something important happening around Google+. It’s the start of a rebellion against the idea of “government authorized names.” (A lot of folks foolishly allow the other side to name this as “real names,” but a real name is a name someone calls you.)

Let’s start with “Why Facebook and Google’s Concept of ‘Real Names’ Is Revolutionary” by “Alex Madrigal.” He explains why the idea is not only not natural, but revolutionary. Then move on to “Why it Matters: Google+ and Diversity, part 2” by “Jon Pincus.” From there, understand see “danah boyd” explain that ““Real Names” Policies Are an Abuse of Power . One natural reaction is ““If you don’t like it, don’t use it. It’s that simple.” ORLY?” as “Alice Marwick” explains, it’s really not that simple. That’s why people like “Skud” are continuing to fight, as shown in “Skud vs. Google+, round two.”

What’s the outcome? Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia require real names. “South Korea is abandoning its “real name” internet policy”

So how do we get there? “Identity Woman” suggested that we have a ““Million” Persona March on Google ,” but she’s now suspended. “Skud” posted “Nymwars strategy.”

This is important stuff for how we shape the future of the internet, and how the future of the internet shapes our lives. Even if you only use one name, you should get involved. Get involved by understanding why names matter, and get involved by calling people what they want to be called, not what Google wants to call them.

Rights at the "Border"

“I was actually woken up with a flashlight in my face,” recalled Mike Santomauro, 27, a law student who encountered the [Border Patrol] in April, at 2 a.m. on a train in Rochester.

Across the aisle, he said, six agents grilled a student with a computer who had only an electronic version of his immigration documents. Through the window, Mr. Santomauro said, he could see three black passengers, standing with arms raised beside a Border Patrol van.

“As a citizen I’m offended,” he said. But he added, “To say I didn’t want to answer didn’t seem a viable option.”

From the NYTimes, “ Border Sweeps in North Reach Miles Into U.S..”

If you think this is ok, where in the US should it not be legal for the armed agents of the state to demand your papers without any grounds for suspicion of wrongdoing?

Similarly, if a law student doesn’t see not answering police questions as a “viable option,” what do we do to restore balance to the Constitution?

Previously on Emergent Chaos: “100 Mile Constitution Free Zone.”

How not to address child ID theft

(San Diego, CA) Since the 1980?s, children in the US have been issued Social Security numbers (SSN) at birth. However, by law, they cannot be offered credit until they reach the age of 18. A child?s SSN is therefore dormant for credit purposes for 18 years. Opportunists have found novel ways to abuse these “dormant” numbers. Unfortunately, credit issuers do not currently have the ability to verify if a SSN belongs to an adult or a minor. If they knew that the SSN presented belonged to a minor they would automatically deny opening a credit account.

Years ago, the Identity Theft Resource Center envisioned a simple solution to this problem. It is called the Minors 17-10 Database and ITRC has been talking with various government entities and legislators about this concept since July 2005. (…)

The creation of a Minors 17-10 Database would provide credit issuers the tool to verify if the SSN provided belongs to a child. This proposed SSA record file would selectively extract the name, month of birth, year of birth, and SSN of every minor from birth to the age of 17 years and 10 months. This record file, maintained by SSA, would be provided monthly to approved credit reporting agencies. When a credit issuer calls about the creditworthiness of a SSN, if
the number is on the Minors 17-10 Database, they would be told that the SSN belongs to a minor.

That’s from a press release mailed out by the normally very good Identity Theft Resource Center. Unfortunately, this idea is totally and subtly broken.

Today, the credit agencies don’t get lists from the SSA. This is a good thing. There’s no authorization under law for them to do so. The fact that they’ve created an externality on young people is no reason to revise that law. The right fix is for them to fix their systems.

The right fix is for credit bureaus to delete any credit history from before someone turns 18. Birth dates could be confirmed by a drivers license, passport or birth certificate.

Here’s how it would work:

  1. Alice turns 18.
  2. Alice applies for credit and discovers she has a credit history
  3. Alice calls the big three credit agencies and gets a runaround explains she’s just turned 18, and apparently has credit from when she was 13.
  4. The credit agency asks for documents, just like they do today (see “when do I need to provide supporting docs”)
  5. The credit agency looks at the birthday they’ve been provided, and substracts 18 years from the year field.
  6. The credit agency removes the record from the report

It’s easy, and doesn’t require anything but a change in process by the credit bureaus. No wonder they haven’t done it, when they can convince privacy advocates that they should get lists of SSN/name/dob tuples from Uncle Sam.

A Blizzard of Real Privacy Stories

Over the last week, there’s been a set of entertaining stories around Blizzard’s World of Warcraft games and forums. First, “World of Warcraft maker to end anonymous forum logins,” in a bid to make the forums less vitriolic:

Mr Brand said that one Blizzard employee posted his real name on the forums, saying that there was no risk to users, and the experiment went drastically wrong. “Within five minutes, users had got hold of his telephone number, home address, photographs of him and a ton of other information,” said Mr Brand.

The customers apparently really liked their privacy, and “Blizzard backs off real-name forum mandate.” Which, you’d think, would end the uproar. But no. This morning, “Gamers Who Complained About Blizzard’s Forum Privacy See Email Addresses Leaked” by the Entertainment Software Rating Board. Interestingly, the ESRB Online Privacy Policy is one of the few that does not start “your privacy is important to us.” Who knew that line was important?

The key lesson is that your customers think about identity differently than you do, and trying to add it to a system is fraught with risk. (Don’t even get me started on the jargon “identity provider.”)

Showing ID In Washington State

Back in October, I endorsed Pete Holmes for Seattle City Attorney, because of slimy conduct by his opponent. It turns out that his opponent was not the only one mis-conducting themselves. The Seattle PD hid evidence from him, and then claimed it was destroyed. They have since changed their story to (apparent) lies about “computer problems.” See “Local computer security expert investigates police practices” in the Seattle PI. Some choice quotes:

…a charge was leveled against him in Seattle Municipal Court for obstructing a public officer. Controversial laws known as obstruction, “stop and frisk” and “stop and identify” statutes have been abused in other cities like New York, studies and news stories show. An obstruction case cited in a 2008 Seattle Post-Intelligencer investigation ended with a federal jury hitting Seattle police with a six-figure penalty.

Rachner’s criminal defense attorney sought dismissal of his gross misdemeanor charge, citing the Washington State Supreme Court decision that says arresting a person for nothing more than withholding identification is unconstitutional. One reason cited by the court: This practice allows police too much discretion to pick targets and punish with arrest. Also, the state constitution is more protective of these rights than the U.S. constitution.
…

The microphone picks up Letizia explaining the arrest to Rachner and a police sergeant, citing only the failure to provide identification as the reason Rachner was in handcuffs. No other provocations before the arrest were documented.
…

“The explanation is our servers failed,” said Seattle Police spokesman Sgt. Sean Whitcomb. “Data was lost, more than his, and it took some time to recover it.” “There is absolutely nothing in the activity log to support that claim,” said Rachner. “Moreover, if the video was unavailable, it was dishonest of them to claim the video could no longer be obtained because it was past the 90-day retention period. It is completely at odds with what they told me in writing.”

I say these are lies because their story keeps changing.

I hate paying the salaries of people who can’t tell me the truth, and I think I’ll be writing city hall for an explanation. If you live in Seattle, I suggest you do the same.

News from RSA: U-Prove

In “U-Prove Minimal Disclosure availability,” Kim Cameron says:

This blog is about technology issues, problems, plans for the future, speculative possibilities, long term ideas – all things that should make any self-respecting product marketer with concrete goals and metrics run for the hills! But today, just for once, I’m going to pick up an actual Microsoft press release and lay it on you. The reason? Microsoft has just done something very special, and the fact that the announcement was a key part of the RSA Conference Keynote is itself important.

Further, Charney explained that identity solutions that provide more secure and private access to both on-site and cloud applications are key to enabling a safer, more trusted enterprise and Internet. As part of that effort, Microsoft today released a community technology preview of the U-Prove technology, which enables online providers to better protect privacy and enhance security through the minimal disclosure of information in online transactions. To encourage broad community evaluation and input, Microsoft announced it is providing core portions of the U-Prove intellectual property under the Open Specification Promise, as well as releasing open source software development kits in C# and Java editions. Charney encouraged the industry, developers and IT professionals to develop identity solutions that help protect individual privacy.

Kim then goes on to analyze the announcement, which is a heck of an important one.

Disclaimer: I work for Microsoft, and am friends with many of the people involved. I still think this is tremendously important.

Puerto Rico: Biggest Identity Theft ever?

puerto-rico-birth-certificate.jpgApparently, the government of Puerto Rico has stolen the identities of something between 1.7 and 4.1 million people

Native Puerto Ricans living outside the island territory are reacting with surprise and confusion after learning their birth certificates will become no good this summer.

A law enacted by Puerto Rico in December mainly to combat identity theft invalidates as of July 1 all previously issued Puerto Rican birth certificates. That means more than a third of the 4.1 million people of Puerto Rican descent living in the 50 states must arrange to get new certificates. (“Shock over voided Puerto Rican birth certificates,” Suzanne Gamboa, AP)

If I’m parsing that right, all 4.1 million identities were stolen from their legitimate holders, and 1/3 of those are outside Puerto Rico, leading to an unclear level of actual effort to get the documents replaced.

Now, some people may take umbrage at my claim that this is identity theft. You might reasonably think that fraud by impersonation requires impersonation. But the reason that it’s called identity theft is that the victim loses control of their identity. False claims are tired to their name, ssn, birth certificate, etc. Those claims show up at random. Their sense that they have “a good name” is diminished and assaulted.

You might also claim that I’m exaggerating, but I’m not the one who titled the article “shock.” People are feeling shocked, confused and assaulted by this action.

So despite the not for profit nature of the crime, this is identity theft on the largest scale I’ve heard about in years.

Image from the Oritz family showcase.

Abdulmutallab/Flight 253 Airline Terror links

And for the prurient interest, the underwear, apparently still containing the explosives. It looks like they were cut off with scissors, implying that he was wearing them at the time. I wonder how much explosive energy a human thigh absorbs?

In conversation, a friend mentioned that the media whirlwind overwhelms the right response, which is to go on with our lives. Which is what I shall now do. Look! A burning goat!

Abdulmutallab/Flight 253 Airline Terror links

  • The Economist “The latest on Northwest flight 253:” “the people who run America’s airport security apparatus appear to have gone insane” and “This is the absolute worst sort of security theatre: inconvenient, absurd, and, crucially, ineffective.”
  • Business Travel Coalition, via Dave Farber and Esther Dyson, “Aviation Security After Detroit:” “It is welcome news that President Obama has ordered an airline industry security review so long as it is strategic in nature.”
  • Stuart Baker, “Six Uncomfortable Answers” which seems to boil down to “identity-based security has failed, let’s not address the good reasons why, and build more of it.” Usually Stewart has been more insightful than this. But then he writes “I asked several questions about how good the screening was in Nigeria and at Schiphol. I now think that it barely matters how good a job those screeners did. Without a reason to treat Abdulmutallab differently from other passengers, the current level of screening wasn’t likely to find the explosives.” Actually, as he points out, no acceptable level of screening is likely to find the explosives.
  • The New York Times points out that “Questions Arise on Why Terror Suspect Was Not Stopped :” “That meant no flags were raised when he used cash to buy a ticket to the United States and boarded a plane, checking no bags.” It used to be that that got you extra screening. Why did we stop?
  • Gawker, “The Shady Mainstream Media Payday of Flight 253 Hero Jasper Schuringa”
  • I lost the link, but someone else pointed out that the new, alleged TSA rules would have made it a crime to get up and stop Abdulmutallab when he tried to set off his bomb.
  • This comment on the Flyertalk thread raises the interesting question: are terrorists planning to fail, expecting over-reaction by governments? Provocation would not be a new page in terror playbooks.
  • Alleged text of SD 1544-09-06
  • Every international traveller to the US is being asked to spend an extra hour on these measures. Cormac Herley’s “So Long, and No Thanks for the Externalities: the Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users” is absolutely irrelevant, unless travel to the US falls. Again. Which, of course, makes the odds of each remaining traveller being a terrorist materially higher.