Author: Russell

As it happens, both the US Government and the UK government are leading “cyber security standards framework” initiatives right now.  The US is using a consensus process to “incorporate existing consensus-based standards to the fullest extent possible”, including “cybersecurity standards, guidelines, frameworks, and best practices” and “conformity assessment programs”. In contrast, the UK is asking…

Read More By looking for evidence first, the Brits do it right

One big problem with existing methods for estimating breach impact is the lack of credibility and reliability of the evidence behind the numbers. This is especially true if the breach is recent or if most of the information is not available publicly.  What if we had solid evidence to use in breach impact estimation?  This…

Read More Indicators of Impact — Ground Truth for Breach Impact Estimation

Adam just posted a question about CEO “willingness to pay” (WTP) to avoid bad publicity regarding a breach event.  As it happens, we just submitted a paper to Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) that proposes a breach impact estimation method that might apply to Adam’s question.  We use the WTP approach in a…

Read More New paper: "How Bad Is It? — A Branching Activity Model for Breach Impact Estimation"

In two recent blog posts (here and here), Chris Wysopal (CTO of Veracode) proposed a metric called “Application Security Debt”.  I like the general idea, but I have found some problems in his method.  In this post, I suggest corrections that will be both more credible and more accurate, at least for half of the…

Read More Fixes to Wysopal’s Application Security Debt Metric

Symantec’s new Norton Cybercrime Index looks like it is mostly a marketing tool. They present it as though there is solid science, data, and methods behind it, but an initial analysis shows that this is probably not the case. The only way to have confidence in this is if Symantec opens up about their algorthms and data.

Read More Is Norton Cybercrime Index just 'Security Metrics Theater'?

If a CISO is expected to be an executive officer (esp. for a large, complex technology- or information-centered organization), then he/she will need the MBA-level knowledge and skill. MBA is one path to getting those skills, at least if you are thoughtful and selective about the school you choose. Other paths are available, so it’s not just about an MBA credential.

Otherwise, if a CISO is essentially the Most Senior Information Security Manager, then MBA education wouldn’t be of much value.

Read More Would a CISO benefit from an MBA education?

I have fundamental objections to Ponemon’s methods used to estimate ‘indirect costs’ due to lost customers (‘abnormal churn’) and the cost of replacing them (‘customer acquisition costs’). These include sloppy use of terminology, mixing accounting and economic costs, and omitting the most serious cost categories.

Read More Another critique of Ponemon's method for estimating 'cost of data breach'

The visual metaphor of a dashboard is a dumb idea for management-oriented information security metrics. It doesn’t fit the use cases and therefore doesn’t support effective user action based on the information. Dashboards work when the user has proportional controllers or switches that correspond to each of the ‘meters’ and the user can observe the effect of using those controllers and switches in real time by observing the ‘meters’. Dashboards don’t work when there is a loose or ambiguous connection between the information conveyed in the ‘meters’ and the actions that users might take. Other visual metaphors should work better.

Read More Dashboards are Dumb

I’d like some feedback on my data analysis, below, from anyone who is an expert on spam or anti-spam technologies. I’ve analyzed data from John Graham-Cumming’s “Spammers’ Compendium” to estimate the technical capabilities of spammers and the evolution path of innovations.

Read More Estimating spammer's technical capabilities and pathways of innovation