Bicycling and Risk

A study found that those who cycle have a net 41% lower risk of premature death. Now, when I read that headline my first thought was that it was 100 people over 6 months and a statistical fluke. But no, they followed a quarter million Britons for 5 years.

Bike commuter

Now, it’s not obvious that it’s causal. Perhaps those who are healthier choose to ride to work? But it seems reasonable to assume that getting a bunch of exercise, fresh air, and adrenaline rushes as distracted drivers read their timeslines as they drive could lead to better health.

The paper is “Association between active commuting and incident cardiovascular disease, cancer, and mortality: prospective cohort study,” and a press discussion is at “Cycling to work may cut your risk of premature death by 40%.”

Photo by Jack Alexander.

Journal of Terrorism and Cyber Insurance

At the RMS blog, we learn they are “Launching a New Journal for Terrorism and Cyber Insurance:”

Natural hazard science is commonly studied at college, and to some level in the insurance industry’s further education and training courses. But this is not the case with terrorism risk. Even if insurance professionals learn about terrorism in the course of their daily business, as they move into other positions, their successors may begin with hardly any technical familiarity with terrorism risk. It is not surprising therefore that, even fifteen years after 9/11, knowledge and understanding of terrorism insurance risk modeling across the industry is still relatively low.

There is no shortage of literature on terrorism, but much has a qualitative geopolitical and international relations focus, and little is directly relevant to terrorism insurance underwriting or risk management.

This is particularly exciting as Gordon Woo was recommended to me as the person to read on insurance math in new fields. His Calculating Catastrophe is comprehensive and deep.

It will be interesting to see who they bring aboard to complement the very strong terrorism risk team on the cyber side.

"Better Safe than Sorry!"

“Better safe than sorry” are the closing words in a NYT story, “A Colorado Town Tests Positive for Marijuana (in Its Water).”

Now, I’m in favor of safety, and there’s a tradeoff being made. Shutting down a well reduces safety by limiting the supply of water, and in this case, they closed a pool, which makes it harder to stay cool in 95 degree weather.

At Wired, Nick Stockton does some math, and says “IT WOULD TAKE A LOT OF THC TO CONTAMINATE A WATER SUPPLY.” (Shouting theirs.)

High-potency THC extract is pretty expensive. One hundred dollars for a gram of the stuff is not an unreasonable price. If this was an accident, it was an expensive one. If this was a prank, it was a financed by Bill Gates…Remember, the highest concentration of THC you can physically get in a liter of water is 3 milligrams.

Better safe than sorry is a tradeoff, and we should talk about it ask such.

Even without drinking the, ummm, kool-aid, this doesn’t pass the giggle test.

Survey for How to Measure Anything In Cybersecurity Risk

This is a survey from Doug Hubbard, author of How To Measure Anything and he is
currently writing another book with Richard Seiersen (GM of Cyber Security at
GE Healthcare) titled How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk. As part of
the research for this book, they are asking for your assistance as an
information security professional by taking the following survey. It
is estimated to take 10 to 25 minutes to complete. In return for participating
in this survey, you will be invited to attend a webinar for a sneak-peek on the
book’s content. You will also be given a summary report of this survey. The
survey also includes requests for feedback on the survey itself.

An Infosec lesson from the "Worst Play Call Ever"

It didn’t take long for the Seahawk’s game-losing pass to get a label.

But as Ed Felten explains, there’s actually some logic to it, and one of his commenters (Chris) points out that Marshawn Lynch scored in only one of his 5 runs from the one yard line this season. So, perhaps in a game in which the Patriots had no interceptions, it was worth the extra play before the clock ran out.

We can all see the outcome, and we judge, post-facto, the decision on that.

Worst play call ever

In security, we almost never see an outcome so closely tied to a decision. As Jay Jacobs has pointed out, we live in a wicked environment. Unfortunately, we’re quick to snap to judgement when we see a bad outcome. That makes learning harder. Also, we don’t usually get a chance to see the logic behind a play and assess it.

If only we had a way to shorten those feedback loops, then maybe we could assess what the worst play call in infosec might be.

And in fact, despite my use of snarky linkage, I don’t think we know enough to judge Sony or ChoicePoint. The decisions made by Spaltro at Sony are not unusual. We hear them all the time in security. The outcome at Sony is highly visible, but is it the norm, or is it an outlier? I don’t think we know enough to know the answer.

Hindsight is 20/20 in football. It’s easy to focus in on a single decision. But the lesson from Moneyball, and the lesson from Pete Carroll is Really, with no second thoughts or hesitation in that at all.” He has a system, and it got the Seahawks to the very final seconds of the game. And then.

One day, we’ll be able to tell management “our systems worked, and we hit really bad luck.”

[Please keep comments civil, like you always do here.]

The Unexpected Meanings of Facebook Privacy Disclaimers

Paul Gowder has an interesting post over at Prawfblog, “In Defense of Facebook Copyright Disclaimer Status Updates (!!!).” He presents the facts:

…People then decide that, hey, goose, gander, if Facebook can unilaterally change the terms of our agreement by presenting new ones where, theoretically, a user might see them, then a user can unilaterally change the terms of our agreement by presenting new ones where, theoretically, some responsible party in Facebook might see them. Accordingly, they post Facebook statuses declaring that they reserve all kinds of rights in the content they post to Facebook, and expressly denying that Facebook acquires any rights to that content by virtue of that posting.

Before commenting on his analysis, which is worth reading in full, there’s an important takeaway, which is that even on Facebook, and even with Facebook’s investment in making their privacy controls more usable, people want more privacy while they’re using Facebook. Is that everyone? No, but it’s enough for the phenomenon of people posting these notices to get noticed.

His analysis instead goes to what we can learn about how people see the law:

To the contrary, I think the Facebook status-updaters reflect both cause for hope and cause for worry about our legal system. The cause for worry is that the system does seem to present itself as magic words. The Facebook status updates, like the protests of the sovereign citizens (but much more mainstream), seem to me to reflect a serious alienation of the public from the law, in which the law isn’t rational, or a reflection of our collective values and ideas about how we ought to treat one another and organize our civic life. Instead, it’s weaponized ritual, a set of pieces of magic paper or bits on a computer screen, administered by a captured priesthood, which the powerful can use to exercise that power over others. With mere words, unhinged from any semblance of autonomy or agreement, Facebook can (the status-updaters perceive) whisk away your property and your private information. This is of a kind with the sort of alienation that I worried about over the last few posts, but in the civil rather than the criminal context: the perception that the law is something done to one, rather than something one does with others as an autonomous agent as well as a democratic citizen. Whether this appears in the form of one-sided boilerplate contracts or petty police harassment, it’s still potentially alienating, and, for that reason, troubling.

This is spot-on. Let me extend it. These “weaponized rituals” are not just at the level of the law. Our institutions are developing anti-bodies to unscripted or difficult to categorize human participation, because engaging with human participation is expensive to deliver and inconvenient to the organization. We see this in the increasingly ritualized engagement with the courts. Despite regular attempts to make courts operate in plain English, it becomes a headline when “Prisoner wins Supreme Court case after submitting handwritten petition.” (Yes, the guy’s apparently otherwise a jerk, serving a life sentence.) Comments to government agencies are now expected to follow a form (and regular commenters learn to follow it, lest their comments engage the organizational anti-bodies on procedural grounds). When John Oliver suggested writing to the FCC, its systems crashed and they had to extend the deadline. Submitting Freedom of Information requests to governments, originally meant to increase transparency and engagement, has become so scripted that there are web sites to track your requests and departmental failures to comply with the statuatory timelines. We have come to accept that our legislators and regulators are looking out for themselves, and no longer ask them to focus on societal good. We are pleasantly surprised when they pay more than lip service to anything beyond their agency’s remit. In such a world, is it any surprise that most people don’t bother to vote?

Such problems are not limited to the law. We no longer talk to the man in the gray flannel suit, we talk to someone reading from a script he wrote. Our interactions with organizations are fenceposted by vague references to “policy.” Telephone script-readers are so irksome to deal with that we all put off making calls, because we know that even asking for a supervisor barely helps. (This underlies why rage-tweeting can actually help cut red tape; it summons a different department to try to work your way through a problem created by intra-organizational shuffling of costs.) Sometimes the references to policy are not vague, but precise, and the precision itself is a cost-shifting ritual. By demanding a form that’s convenient to itself, an organization can simultaneously call for engagement while making that engagement expensive and frustrating. When engaging requires understanding the the system as well as those who are immersed in it, engagement is discouraged. We can see this at Wikipedia, for example, discussed in a blog post like “The Closed, Unfriendly World of Wikipedia.” Wikipedia has evolved a system for managing disputes, and that system is ritualized. Danny Sullivan doesn’t understand why they want him to jump through hoops and express himself in the way that makes it easy for them to process.

Such ritualized forms of engagement display commitment to the organization. This can inform our understanding of how social engineers work. Much of their success at impersonating employees comes from being fluid in the use of a victim’s jargon, and in the 90s, much of what was published in 2600 was lists of Ma Bell’s acronyms or descriptions of operating procedures. People believe that only an employee would bother to learn such things, and so learning such things acts as an authenticator in ways that infuriate technical system designers.

What Gowder calls rituals can also be viewed as protocols (or protocol messages). They are the formalized, algorithm friendly, state-machine altering messages, and thus we’ll see more of them.

Such growth makes systems brittle, as they focus on processing those messages and not others. Brittle systems break in chaotic and often ugly ways.

So let me leave this with a question: how can we design systems which scale without becoming brittle, and also allow for empathy?

The Psychology of Password Managers

As I think more about the way people are likely to use a password manager, I think there’s real problems with the way master passwords are set up. As I write this, I’m deeply aware that I’m risking going into a space of “it’s logical that” without proper evidence.

Let’s start from the way most people will likely come to a password manager. They’ll be in an exploratory mood, and while they may select a good password, they may also select a simple one that’s easy to remember. That password, initially, will not be protecting very much, and so people may be tempted to pick one that’s ‘appropriate’ for what’s being protected.

Over time, the danger is that they will not think to update that password and improve it, but their trust in the password manager will increase. As their trust increases, the number of passwords that they’re protecting with a weak master password may also increase.

Now we get to changing the master password. Assuming that people can find it, how often will someone wake up and say “hey, I should change my master password?” Changing a master password is also scary. Now that I’ve accumulated hundreds of passwords, what happens if I forget my new password? (As it turns out, 1Password makes weekly backups of my password file, but I wasn’t aware of that. Also, what happens to the old files if I change my master password? Am I now exposed for both? That’s ok in the case that I’m changing out of caution, less ok if I’m changing because I think my master was exposed.)

Perhaps there’s room for two features here: first, that on password change, people could choose to have either master password unlock things. (Encrypt the master key with keys derived from both the old & new masters. This is no less secure than having backups available, and may address a key element of psychological acceptability.) You’d have to communicate that this will work, and let people choose. User testing that text would be fascinating.

A second feature might be to let people know how long they’ve been using the same master password, and gently encourage them to change it. This one is tricky mostly because I have no idea if it’s a good idea. Should you pick one super-strong master and use it for decades? Is there value to changing it now and again? Where could we seek evidence with which to test our instincts? What happens to long term memory as people age? Does muscle memory cause people to revert their passwords? (I know I’ve done it.) We could use a pattern like the gold bar to unobtrusively prompt.

A last element that might improve the way people use master passwords would be better browser integration. Having just gone to check, I was surprised how many sites my browser is tracking. Almost all of them were low value, and all of them now are. But why do we have two places that can store this, especially when one is less secure than the other. A browser API that allows a password manager to say “I’ve got this one” would be a welcome improvement.

Studying these ideas and seeing which ones are invalidated by data gathering would be cool. Talking to people about how they use their password managers would also be interesting work. As Bonneau has show, the quest to replace passwords is going to be arduous. Learning how to better live with what we have seems useful.

Gamifying Driving

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…the new points system rates the driver’s ability to pilot the MINI with a sporty yet steady hand. Praise is given to particularly sprightly sprints, precise gear changes, controlled braking, smooth cornering and U-turns executed at well-judged speeds. For example, the system awards maximum Experience Points for upshifts carried out within the ideal rev range and in less than 1.2 seconds. Super-slick gear changes prompt a “Perfect change up” message on the on-board monitor, while a “Breathtaking U-turn” and a masterful touch with the anchors (“Well-balanced braking”) are similarly recognised with top marks and positive, MINI-style feedback.

For more, see “MINI Connected Adds Driving Excitement Analyser.”

Now, driving is the most dangerous thing most of us do on a regular basis. Most Americans don’t get any supplemental driving instruction after they turn 17. So maybe there’s actually something to be said for a system that incents people to drive better.

I can’t see any possible issues with a game pushing people towards things that are undesirable in the real world. I mean, I’m sure that before suggesting a U-turn, the game will use the car’s adaptive cruise control radar to see what’s around, even if the car doesn’t have one.

Guns, Homicides and Data

I came across a fascinating post at Jon Udell’s blog, “Homicide rates in context ,” which starts out with this graph of 2007 data:

A map showing gun ownership and homicide rates, and which look very different

Jon’s post says more than I care to on this subject right now, and points out questions worth asking.

As I said in my post on “Thoughts on the Tragedies of December 14th,” “those who say that easy availability of guns drives murder rates must do better than simply cherry picking data.”

I’m not sure I believe that the “more guns, less crime” claim made by A.W.R. Hawkins claim is as causative as it sounds, but the map presents a real challenge to simplistic responses to tragic gun violence.

Privacy and Health Care

In my post on gun control and schools, I asserted that “I worry that reducing privacy around mental health care is going to deter people who need health care from getting it.”

However, I didn’t offer up any evidence for that claim. So I’d like to follow up with some details from a report that talks about this in great detail, “The Case for Informed Consent” by Patient Privacy Rights.

So let me quote two related numbers from that report.

First, between 13 and 17% of Americans admit in surveys to hiding health information in the current system. That’s probably a lower-bound, as we can expect some of the privacy sensitive population will decline to be surveyed, and some fraction of those who are surveyed may hide their information hiding. (It’s information-hiding all the way down.)

Secondly, 1 in 8 Americans (12.5%) put their health at risk because of privacy concerns, including avoiding their regular doctor, asking their doctor to record a different diagnosis, or avoiding tests.

I’ll also note that these numbers relate to general health care, and the numbers may be higher for often-stigmatized mental health issues.