I’m pleased to be able to share work that Shostack & Associates and the Cyentia Institute have been doing for the Global Cyber Alliance. In doing this, we created some new threat models for email, and some new statistical analysis of
It shows the 1,046 domains that have successfully activated strong protection with GCA’s DMARC tools will save an estimated $19 million to $66 million dollars from limiting BEC for the year of 2018 alone. These organizations will continue to reap that reward every year in which they maintain the deployment of DMARC. Additional savings will be realized as long as DMARC is deployed.
There’s an interesting article at the CBC, about how in Canada, “More than a dozen federal departments flunked a credit card security test:”
Those 17 departments and agencies continue to process payments on Visa, MasterCard, Amex, the Tokyo-based JCB and China UnionPay cards, and federal officials say there have been no known breaches to date.
There are some interesting details about the who and why, but what I want to focus on is the lack of (detected) breaches to date, and the impact of the audit failure.
The fact that there have been no breaches detected is usually a no-op, you can’t learn anything from it, but with credit cards, there’s a “Common Point of Purchase” analysis program that eventually turns a spotlight on larger “merchants” who’ve been breached. So the lack of detection tells us something, which is that a large set of PCI failures don’t lead to breaches. From that we can, again, question if PCI prevents breaches, or if it does so better than other security investments.
The second thing is that this is now a “drop everything and fix it” issue, because it’s in the press. Should passing PCI be the top priority for government agencies? I generally don’t think so, but likely it will absorb the security budget for the year for a dozen departments.
I had not seen this interesting letter (August 27, 2018) from the House Energy and Commerce Committee to DHS about the nature of funding and support for the CVE.
This is the sort of thoughtful work that we hope and expect government departments do, and kudos to everyone involved in thinking about how CVE should be nurtured and maintained.
“20 Ways to Make AppSec Move at the Speed of DevOps” is in CSO. It’s a good collection, and I’m quoted.
Congratulations to the 2016 winners!
- Dan Geer, Chief Information Security Officer at In-Q-Tel;
- Lance J. Hoffman, Distinguished Research Professor of Computer Science, The George Washington University;
- Horst Feistel, Cryptographer and Inventor of the United States Data Encryption Standard (DES);
- Paul Karger, High Assurance Architect, Prolific Writer and Creative Inventor;
- Butler Lampson, Adjunct Professor at MIT, Turing Award and Draper Prize winner;
- Leonard J. LaPadula, Co-author of the Bell-LaPadula Model of Computer Security; and
- William Hugh Murray, Pioneer, Author and Founder of the Colloquium for Information System Security Education (CISSE)
In a world where influence seems to be measured in likes, re-tweets and shares, the work by these 7 fine people really stands the test of time. For some reason this showed up on Linkedin as “Butler was mentioned in the news,” even though it’s a few years old. Again, test of time.
I’m honored to have my threat modeling book on this short list with Daniel Kahneman, Tony Hsieh, Nicole Forsgren, and Tom DeMarco: “Summer Reading List: Top Recommendations from our Engineers.”
Today, a global coalition led by civil society and technology experts sent a letter asking the government of Australia to abandon plans to introduce legislation that would undermine strong encryption. The letter calls on government officials to become proponents of digital security and work collaboratively to help law enforcement adapt to the digital era.
In July 2017, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull held a press conference to announce that the government was drafting legislation that would compel device manufacturers to assist law enforcement in accessing encrypted information. In May of this year, Minister for Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Angus Taylor restated the government’s priority to introduce legislation and traveled to the United States to speak with companies based there.
Today’s letter signed by 76 organizations, companies, and individuals, asks leaders in the government “not to pursue legislation that would undermine tools, policies, and technologies critical to protecting individual rights, safeguarding the economy, and providing security both in Australia and around the world.” (Read the full announcement here)
I’m pleased to have joined in this effort by Accessnow, and you can sign, too, at https://secureaustralia.org.au. Especially if you are Australian, I encourage you to do so.
In “Conway’s Law: does your organization’s structure make software security even harder?,” Steve Lipner mixes history and wisdom:
As a result, the developers understood pretty quickly that product security was their job rather than ours. And instead of having twenty or thirty security engineers trying to “inspect (or test) security in” to the code, we had 30 or 40 thousand software engineers trying to create secure code. It made a big difference.
The NTSB has released “Preliminary Report Highway HWY18MH010,” on the Uber self-driving car which struck and killed a woman. I haven’t had a chance to read the report carefully.
Brad Templeton has excellent analysis of the report at “NTSB Report implies serious fault for Uber in fatality” (and Brad’s writings overall on the subject have been phenomenal.)
A few important things to note, cribbed from Brad.
- The driver was not looking at her phone, but a screen with diagnostic information from the self-driving systems.
- The car detected a need to brake with approximately enough time to stop had it automatically applied the brakes.
- That system was turned off for a variety of reasons that look bad (in hindsight, and probably could have been critiqued at the time).
My only comment right now is wouldn’t it be nice to have this level of fact finding in the world of cyber?
Also, it’s very clear that the vehicle was carefully preserved. Can anyone say how the NTSB and/or Uber preserved the data center, cloud or other remote parts of the computer systems involved, including the algorithms that were deployed that day (versus reconstructing them later)?