- Making Software “What Really Works, and Why We Believe It” by Andy Oram and Greg Wilson. This collection of essays is a fascinating view into the state of the art in empirical analysis software engineering.
- Agile Application Security by Laura Bell, Michael Brunton-Spall, Rich Smith and Jim Bird. A really good overview of the many moving pieces in an agile SDL. Good enough that I bought a paper copy to augment the ebook. (Also, sometimes redundant, and says nice things about my work.)
- Click Here to Kill Everybody by Bruce Schneier. Thought-provoking survey of the problems that come from the book above not being better read. More seriously, we haven’t scaled application security, and even if we do, there will be bad developers who’ll do a crappy job at building things. What can we do about that as a society? I don’t like all of Schneier’s answers, but the reasoning is sound.
- Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator by Ryan Holiday lays out the toolbox of the fellow who used to run marketing for American Apparel. Shows how guerrilla marketing works in the age of Twitter, and outlines techniques now being used to screw up elections and people’s lives.
- The Internet of Garbage by Sarah Jeong. As a summary of the problems and challenges of the internet, it’s aged sadly well since 2015.
- The Tangled Tree: A Radical New History of Life. We’re used to thinking that genes are passed on from parents, but as David Quammen explains, there’s also horizontal gene transfer (NIH, Wikipedia). Really fascinating history of both science and the personalities involved. Recommended despite the writing being somewhat rocky and uneven – these are hard topics and I do not envy the author’s task of making an accessible and interesting read.
- Things We Think About Games by Will Hindmarch and Jeff Tidball is 140 micro-essays about games. Some I loved, some I hated, but I enjoyed the heck out of it.
As it turns out, all three fiction books are re-imaginings of other stories. If you find that wicked annoying, these are not for you.
- The Queens of Innis Lear, by Tessa Gratton is a re-telling of Lear from the perspective of his daughters.
- A Study in Honor, Claire O’Dell re-tells the Holmes/Watston story in the aftermath of a second American Civil War.
- Spinning Silver, Naomi Novik is a re-telling of the Rumplestiltskin tale. (Hugo nominated)
That’s what I read last quarter that I want to share. What was memorable for you?
“90% of attacks start with phishing!*” “Cyber attacks will cost the world 6 trillion by 2020!”
We’ve all seen these sorts of numbers from vendors, and in a sense they’re April Fools day numbers: you’d have to be a fool to believe them. But vendors quote insane because there’s no downside and much upside. We need to create more and worse downside, and the road there lies through losing sales.
We need to call vendors on these number, and say “I’m sorry, but if you’d lie to me about that, what about the numbers you’re claiming that are hard to verify? The door is to your left.”
If we want to change the behavior, we have to change the impact of the behavior. We need to tell vendors that there’s no place for made up numbers, debunked numbers, unsupported numbers in our buying processes. If those numbers are in their sales and marketing material, they’re going to lose business for it.
* This one seems to trace back to analysis that 90% of APT attacks in the Verizon DBIR started with phishing, but APT and non-APT attacks are clearly different.
“Today, let me contrast two 20-year-old papers on threat modeling. My first paper on this topic, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do,” written with Bruce Schneier, analyzed smart-card security. We talked about categories of threats, threat actors, assets — all the usual stuff for a paper of that era. We took the stance that “we experts have thought hard about these problems, and would like to share our results.”
Around the same time, on April 1, 1999, Loren Kohnfelder and Praerit Garg published a paper in Microsoft’s internal “Interface” journal called “The Threats to our Products.” It was revolutionary, despite not being publicly available for over a decade. What made the Kohnfelder and Garg paper revolutionary is that it was the first to structure the process of how to find threats. It organized attacks into a model (STRIDE), and that model was intended to help people find problems, as noted…”
Read the full version of “20 Years of STRIDE: Looking Back, Looking Forward” on Dark Reading.
“Cybersecurity is not very important” is a new paper by the very smart Andrew Odlyzko. I do not agree with everything he says, but it’s worth reading and pondering if and why you disagree with it. I think I agree with it more than I disagree.
RSA has posted a video of my talk, “Threat Modeling in 2019”
I’ve signed on to Access Now’s letter to the Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, asking the Government of India to withdraw the draft amendments proposed to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules.
As they say in their press release:
Today’s letter, signed by an international coalition of 31 organizations and individuals, explains how the proposed amendments threaten fundamental rights and the space for a free internet, while not addressing the problems that the Ministry aims to resolve. A key concern is the requirement for intermediaries to “enable tracing out of such originator” of content that an intermediary hosts, which could lead to demands that providers weaken the security features of their products and services. This threat to privacy would in turn endanger free expression.
There’s only a few times to use a pie chart, but to help you celebrate, there’s how to keep track of your intake:
Bruce Schneier and I wrote an article on Facebook’s privacy changes: “A New Privacy Constitution for Facebook.”
I’m quite happy to say that my next Linkedin Learning course has launched! This one is all about spoofing.
It’s titled “Threat Modeling: Spoofing in Depth.” It’s free until at least a week after RSA.
Also, I’m exploring the idea that security professionals lack a shared body of knowledge about attacks, and that an entertaining and engaging presentation of such a BoK could be a useful contribution. A way to test this is to ask how often you hear attacks discussed at a level of abstraction that’s puts the attacks into a category other than “OMG the sky is falling, patch now.” Another way to test is to watch for fluidity in moving from one type of spoofing attack to another.
Part of my goal of the course is to help people see that attacks cluster and have similarities, and that STRIDE can act as a framework for chunking knowledge.