Ron Woerner had me on as a guest in his business of security podcast series. It was fun to tease out some of the business justifications for threat modeling, and the podcast is now live at itunes. You can learn more about the series at Business of Security Podcast Series.
The fine folks at Logmein have released a version of Elevation of Privilege that adds privacy! Check out the fine work by Mark Vinkovits at their blog, “Privacy-By-Design Can Be Entertaining” by Mark Vinkovits.
I’m pleased to be able to share work that Shostack & Associates and the Cyentia Institute have been doing for the Global Cyber Alliance. In doing this, we created some new threat models for email, and some new statistical analysis of
It shows the 1,046 domains that have successfully activated strong protection with GCA’s DMARC tools will save an estimated $19 million to $66 million dollars from limiting BEC for the year of 2018 alone. These organizations will continue to reap that reward every year in which they maintain the deployment of DMARC. Additional savings will be realized as long as DMARC is deployed.
I have regularly asked why we don’t know more about the Equifax breach, including in comments in “That Was Close! Reward Reporting of Cybersecurity ‘Near Misses’.” These questions are not intended to attack Equifax. Rather, we can use their breach as a mirror to reflect, and ask questions about how defenses work, and learn things we can bring to our own systems.
Ian Melvin was kind enough to point out a GAO report, “Actions Taken by Equifax and Federal Agencies in Response to the 2017 Breach.” As you’d expect of a GAO report, it is level headed and provides a set of facts.
However, I still have lots of questions. Some very interesting details start on page 11:
Equifax officials added that, after gaining the ability to issue system-level commands on the online dispute portal that was originally compromised, the attackers issued queries to other databases to search for sensitive data. This search led to a data repository containing PII, as well as unencrypted usernames and passwords that could provide the attackers access to several other Equifax databases. According to Equifax’s interim Chief Security Officer, the attackers were able to leverage these credentials to expand their access beyond the 3 databases associated with the online dispute portal, to include an additional 48 unrelated
The use of encryption allowed the attackers to blend in their malicious actions with regular activity on the Equifax network and, thus, secretly maintain a presence on that network as they launched further attacks without being detected by Equifax’s scanning software. (Editor’s note: I’ve inverted the order of the paragraphs from the source.)
So my questions include:
- How did the attackers get root?
- Why wasn’t the root shell noticed? Would our organization notice an extra root sell in production?
- How did they get access to the other 48 databases?
- Why didn’t the pattern of connections raise a flag? “As before, Equifax
officials stated that the attackers were able to disguise their presence by
blending in with regular activity on the network.” I find this statement to be surprising, and it raises questions: Does the dispute resolution database normally connect to these other databases and run the queries which were run? How was that normal activity characterized and analyzed? Encryption provides content confidentiality, not meta-data confidentiality. Would we detect these extra connections?
Specifically, while Equifax had installed a device to inspect network traffic for evidence of malicious activity, a misconfiguration allowed encrypted traffic to pass through the network without being inspected. According to Equifax officials, the misconfiguration was due to an expired digital certificate. The certificate had expired about 10 months before the breach occurred, meaning that encrypted traffic was not being inspected throughout that period.
Would your organization notice if one of hundreds or dozens of IDSs shut up for a week, or if one ruleset stopped firing?
More published incident reports will help us get smarter, and provide better answers to the questions that CEOs and boards are asking: could this happen to us? With this report we an answer that better, but still not well.
There’s an interesting article at the CBC, about how in Canada, “More than a dozen federal departments flunked a credit card security test:”
Those 17 departments and agencies continue to process payments on Visa, MasterCard, Amex, the Tokyo-based JCB and China UnionPay cards, and federal officials say there have been no known breaches to date.
There are some interesting details about the who and why, but what I want to focus on is the lack of (detected) breaches to date, and the impact of the audit failure.
The fact that there have been no breaches detected is usually a no-op, you can’t learn anything from it, but with credit cards, there’s a “Common Point of Purchase” analysis program that eventually turns a spotlight on larger “merchants” who’ve been breached. So the lack of detection tells us something, which is that a large set of PCI failures don’t lead to breaches. From that we can, again, question if PCI prevents breaches, or if it does so better than other security investments.
The second thing is that this is now a “drop everything and fix it” issue, because it’s in the press. Should passing PCI be the top priority for government agencies? I generally don’t think so, but likely it will absorb the security budget for the year for a dozen departments.
A few weeks ago, I talked about “reflective practice in threat modeling“, thinking about how we approach the problems we face, and asking if our approaches are the best we can do. Sometimes it’s hard to reflect. It’s hard to face the mirror and say ‘could I have done that better?’ That’s human nature.
Sometimes, it can be easier to learn from an analogy, and I’ll again go to physical buildings as a source. (I last discussed this in “Architectural Review and Threat Modeling“.)
Here, we see 91 units of housing delayed for 3-4 months about the color of the exterior:
A project to create 91 units of microhousing on First Hill will take a second try at getting final sign-off from the board…In June, the board asked that the project return for a second pass citing unhappiness with the choice of cement fiber panel finish to step down at the upper levels of the northern edge of the building and echoing public comment that the color of bricks selected for the building was too dark for the neighborhood’s existing “context.” (Capitol Hill Seattle blog)
Now, Seattle has a very visible crisis of housing and homelessness. These 91 units will likely help 91 people or families get off the street. But…the color of the bricks is wrong, so stay on the streets for an extra few months? I exaggerate for effect and consideration, not of this choice, but to ask for reflection — are there choices imposed by security that make such a tradeoff in your organization?
Are you holding back revenue or customer satisfaction for goals that might wait, or might simply not be as important from an executive standpoint?
And if you have a tracking system for projects, it has to work.
The number of Seattle permit applications completing initial review plummeted 75 percent from April to May, from 266 to 66. Builders say problems with the system are setting their projects back by weeks or months…Soon after launch, the new system repeatedly stalled and permit documents appeared to go missing. Tempers grew so hot that at one point the city called the police on a livid customer… In May, less than 11 percent of medium-complexity projects hit the two-week target. (“Rocky launch of Seattle’s new construction-permit system causes delays, anger.“)
Security can be the reason projects are consistently randomized or miss their deadlines, and when it is, other teams work around us, ignore us, or question why they’re paying for a security function that doesn’t function.
The world is a fine source of opportunities to reflect, if only we take advantage.
I had not seen this interesting letter (August 27, 2018) from the House Energy and Commerce Committee to DHS about the nature of funding and support for the CVE.
This is the sort of thoughtful work that we hope and expect government departments do, and kudos to everyone involved in thinking about how CVE should be nurtured and maintained.
(Updated March 2019, to use a wayback machine link rather than the original house.gov link.)