Threat Modeling and Architecture

Threat Modeling and Architecture” is the latest in a series at Infosec Insider.

After I wrote my last article on Rolling out a Threat Modeling Program, Shawn Chowdhury asked (on Linkedin) for more informatioin on involving threat modeling in the architecture process. It’s a great question, except it involves the words “threat, “modeling,” and “architecture.” And each of those words, by itself, is enough to get some people twisted around an axle.

Continue reading “Threat Modeling and Architecture”

Breach Vouchers & Equifax

[Saturday, September 16th is the latest of 4 updates.]

When I wrote “The Breach Response Market Is Broken,” I didn’t expect one of the players to validate everything I had to say. What I said was that the very act of firms contracting with breach response services inhibit the creation of a market for breach response, and the FTC should require them to give vouchers to consumers.

Vice Motherboard is reporting that “Firm Hired to Monitor Data Breaches Is Hacked, 143 Million Social Security Numbers Stolen.”

It’s not clear what database was accessed. On their website, Equifax says “No Evidence of Unauthorized Access to Core Consumer or Commercial Credit Reporting Databases” and “Company to Offer Free Identity Theft Protection and Credit File Monitoring to All U.S. Consumers.”

But here’s the thing; I don’t trust Equifax to protect data that … they just failed to protect. I want protection from an independent firm.

Equifax’s self-dealing in providing breach response services is unfair. No rational, well-informed consumer would select Equifax’s service in this situation. Equifax’s offering of credit file monitoring to all US consumers is also an unfair trade practice, which undercuts innovation, and limits the ability of new entrants to deliver effective services.

The FTC should require Equifax to send a voucher to each impacted individual which can be used to purchase any identity theft protection service on the market as of August, 2017.

Usually I don’t try to blog fast moving stories, but I may make an exception.

Update 1, later that day:

Update 2, Sept 9:

  • The International Business Times reports “Equifax Lobbied To Kill Rule Protecting Victims Of Data Breaches.” They report Equifax wrote “a rule blocking companies from forcing their customers to waive class action rights would expose credit agencies ‘to unmanageable class action liability that could result in full disgorgement of revenues’ if companies are found to have illegally harmed their customers.” It’s a nice life, having the government block your victims from suing you, especially if you’re worried that the harm is great enough to result in ‘full disgorgement of revenues.’ Now, you might argue that’s hyperbole, but maybe it’s a real fear.
  • The Onion reports “Equifax Impressed By Hackers’ Ability To Ruin People’s Finances More Efficiently Than Company Can.”
  • Equifax once brought me to a Nine Inch Nails concert, and under the payola rules, I ought to have disclosed that when writing about them. It was over a decade ago, and had slipped my mind.

Update 3, Sept 12:

Update 4, September 16:

Open for Business

Recently, I was talking to a friend who wasn’t aware that I’m consulting, and so I wanted to share a bit about my new life, consulting!

I’m consulting for companies of all sizes and in many sectors. The services I’m providing include threat modeling training, engineering and strategy work, often around risk analysis or product management.

Some of the projects I’ve completed recently include:

  • Threat modeling training – Engineers learn how to threat model, and how to make threat modeling part of their delivery. Classes range from 1 to 5 days, and are customized to your needs.
  • Process re-engineering for a bank – Rebuilt their approach to a class of risks, increasing security, consistently and productively across the org.
  • Feature analysis for a security company – Identifying market need, what features fit those needs, and created a compelling and grounded story to bring the team together.

If you have needs like these, or other issues where you think my skills and experience could help, I’d love to hear from you. And if you know someone who might, I’m happy to talk to them.

I have a to-the-point website at and some details of my threat modeling services are at

Star Wars, Star Trek and Getting Root on a Star Ship

It’s time for some Friday Star Wars blogging!

Reverend Robert Ballecer, SJ tweeted: “as a child I learned a few switches & 4 numbers gives you remote code ex on a 23rd century starship.” I responded, asking “When attackers are on the bridge and can flip switches, how long a password do you think is appropriate?”

It went from there, but I’d like to take this opportunity to propose a partial threat model for 23rd century starships.

First, a few assumptions:

  • Sometimes, officers and crewmembers of starships die, are taken prisoner, or are otherwise unable to complete their duties.
  • It is important that the crew can control the spaceship, including software and computer hardware.
  • Unrestricted physical access to the bridge means you control the ship (with possible special cases, and of course, the Holodeck because lord forgive me, they need to shoot a show every week. Scalzi managed to get a surprisingly large amount from this line of inquiry in Red Shirts. But I digress.)

I’ll also go so far as to say that as a derivative of the assumptions, the crew may need a rapid way to assign “Captain” privileges to someone else, and starship designers should be careful to design for that use case.

So the competing threats here are denial of service (and possibly denial of future service) and elevation of privilege. There’s a tension between designing for availability (anyone on the bridge can assume command relatively easily) and proper authorization. My take was that the attackers on the bridge are already close to winning, and so defenses which impede replacing command authority are a mistake.

Now, in responding, I thought that “flipping switches” meant physically being there, because I don’t recall the episode that he’s discussing. But further in further conversation, what became clear is that the switches can be flipped remotely, which dramatically alters the need for a defense.

It’s not clear what non-dramatic requirement such remote switch flipping serves, and so on balance, it’s easy to declare that the added risk is high and we should not have remote switch flipping. It is always easy to declare that the risk is high, but here I have the advantage that there’s no real product designer in the room arguing for the feature. If there was, we would clarify the requirement, and then probably engineer some appropriate defenses, such as exponential backoff for remote connections. Of course, in the future with layers of virtualization, what a remote connection is may be tricky to determine in software.

Which brings me to another tweet, by Hongyi Hu, who said he was “disappointed that they still use passwords for authentication in the 23rd century. I hope the long tail isn’t that long! 😛” What can I say but, “we’ll always have passwords.” We’ll just use them for less.

As I’ve discussed, the reason I use Star Wars over Star Trek in my teaching and examples is that no one is confused about the story in the core movies. I made precisely this mistake.

Image: The Spaceship Discovery, rendered by Trekkie5000. Alert readers will recall issues that could have been discovered with better threat modeling.