Threat Modeling in 2019

Adam Shostack
About Adam Shostack
What’s Changing in Threat Modeling?

What’s changing in the world?

Tyler Barrass, accused of making hoax call, regrets death of ‘swatting’ victim

· Andrew Finch shot dead on his doorstep by armed police
· Barrass: ‘I feel a little remorse for what happened’

IoT Robot Vacuum Vulnerabilities Let Hackers Spy on Victims

Dutch spies reportedly caught Russian hackers on video

By Associated Press | January 26, 2018 | 6:13am
2019 in a Nutshell

Thanks to John of Vordio.net
Four Questions for Threat Modeling

- What are we working on?
- What can go wrong?
- What are we going to do about it?
- Did we do a good job?
Agenda

• **What are we working on? How are we working on it?**
  – The fast moving world of cyber
  – The agile world
  – Models are scary

• **What can go wrong? Threats evolve!**
  – STRIDE
  – Machine Learning
  – Conflict Modeling

Four Questions for Threat Modeling

• What are we working on?
• What can go wrong?
• What are we going to do about it?
• Did we do a good job?
THE FAST MOVING WORLD OF CYBER
Everything’s Changing So Fast!…?

• Models help us see similarities & understand change

• Example: Morris worm (1988)
  – Stack smashing (~1970-now*)
  – Common passwords (epoch – end of days)
  – Mis-configured daemons (1988-200?)
Fast Changing World: IoT

• More sensors and actuators
  – Look like cars and door-opening dogs
• Run Linux like it’s 1999
• Cost: lightbulbs to jet engines
• Impact: water sensors to medical devices
• New attackers
The Ways To Threat Model Are … Evolving and Responding

• Many building blocks
  – Tools: MS TM (IDE), Tutamantic (discrete), IriusRisk (enterprise)*
  – Approaches: STRIDE, Kill Chain
  – Deliverables: bugs, backlogs, documents…

• Building block frame helps contextualize change

* Disclosure: I’m on the advisory board of Continuum Security, makers of IriusRisk
AGILE
• Threat modeling is no more inherently waterfall than Ruby
• Threat modeling in agile, CI/CD
• Waterfall vs agile
  – Skills, tasks, frameworks are similar
  – Deliverables and scoping are very different

• Benefits of fast cycles
  – Controls, quality to address threats in the backlog
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Big complex scope</td>
<td>• Scope tiny: this sprint’s change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• System diagrams &amp; essays</td>
<td>• Big picture as security debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gates, dependencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding Threats</td>
<td>• Brainstorm</td>
<td>• Same, aim at in-sprint code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• STRIDE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Kill Chain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixes</td>
<td>• Controls</td>
<td>• Spikes to understand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mitigations</td>
<td>• Sec-focused stories in sprint, backlog, or epic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Test cases</td>
<td>• Sec. acceptance criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>• Test plans</td>
<td>• Test automation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Starting Threat Modeling When Agile

• Start agile: work the features being built
  – Develop skills
  – Demonstrate value
  – Get buy-in: security properties and assurance

• Then worry about the security debt
  – “What can go wrong” analysis exposes debt
  – All up dataflows (borrow from GDPR)
“How do you feel about the term "threat modeling?" Is it intimidating/scary/military?” — Eva Galperin

MODELS ARE SCARY
As Easy As Possible, But No Easier

- We should respect the concern
- We should make threat modeling easier

— and —

- People model all the time
- Some things are hard
In a World of Automated Code Generation…

• Models require thought
• Thoughts might be wrong
• Quality requires judgement, not just “it compiles”

• So, models are scary
Which Model Is Better?
“All models are wrong, some models are useful”

—George Box
Dialogue before Discussion

**Dialogue**
- Explore ideas and consequences
  - “What if?”
  - “How about”
- Prototypes & experiments
- Fluid not fixed

**Discussion**
- Commit to one idea
- Production code
- Fixed not fluid

*Borrowing from John Allspaw (Etsy, kitchensoap.com)*
System Models Serve Different Goals

Dialog
- Words
  - Slack & email
- Whiteboard
- "Visio"

Discussion
- Spec
  - "Visio"

Review
- Plan of record
  - Photoshop

Use

Participants

Time

23
Different Goals

- Different goals, different deliverables
  - Dialogue: whiteboard
  - Inform: fancy documents

- Implicit goals generate conflict
  - If you want dialogue, don’t ask team to bring a diagram
  - “Oh, you want a review and sign off, not new choices!”

- Implicit goals generate work
  - Who needs a fancy document and why?
STOP! WHO APPROACHETH THE BRIDGE OF PRODUCT RELEASE MUST ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS THREE...

WHAT IS YOUR NAME? WHAT IS YOUR QUEST? WHERE IS YOUR THREAT MODEL?
Cloud and Serverless

• Cloud provider takes over platform issues
  – Platform-level threats are theirs
• Business level threats remain
  – Spoofing an employee of your company to your cloud admin
• Threat model your build, deploy pipelines
WHAT CAN GO WRONG?
“What Can Go Wrong” Agenda

- STRIDE
- Adversarial Machine Learning
- Operations: Kill Chain/Threat Genomics/Att&CK
- Conflict
STRIDE

• Turned 20 this year!
• Still helpful mnemonic
  – Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Info Disclosure, DoS, Elevation of Privilege
  – Wide range of system types
  – New details for various threats
• STRIDE-LM 😂
Spoofing

- Phone authentication
- Markets for selfies
- Audio/video spoofing
Spoofing and Phone Authentication

• SMS or calls
  – SMS specifically deprecated by US Gov regulators
• “Phone porting attacks”
• Scamicry: Callers demand authentication from callee
Spoofing Facial Recognition

• Markets for Selfies
  – April 2016: MasterCard announces Identity Check (“Pay with a selfie!”)
  – March 2018: Sixgill reports selfies in darkweb fullz

• Impersonation tools
  – LED Baseball cap allows impersonation
Spoofing Audio

• Voice cloning as a service!
  – Startups, open source: CandyVoice, Festvox, Vivotext, Lyrebird…

• Formal or background authentication

• Google Duplex voice interaction as a service lets you scale
  – BEC 2.0: “This is the CEO, need you to pay …”
  – Phishing 3.0: “Hi honey, just real quick, what’s the Netflix pw?”
Spoofing Video

• “Deepfake” video democratizes, improves video fakery
• Machine learning to imitate a victim
• Create new video
• Overlay new faces onto existing
• Warning: lots of disturbing examples
Deepfake Example (SFW)
Tampering

• “AirBNB attacker” can tamper with each device
  – (Thanks to Roy D’Souza for the evocative term)

• Tapplock vs screwdriver
Repudiation

Migrating Stork Racks Up $2,700 On Researchers' Cell Phone Bill
Information Disclosure

• Location
  – DOD Ban
• Other sensors

Secretive locations are blurred by Google on satellite imagery, but Polar reveals the individuals exercising there.

Info Disclose & Fast Moving World of Sensors

- Phones drive sensor tech: quality and cost
- Sensors in everything
- Exceed our intuition
  - Accelerometers measure typing
  - Microphones + ultrasound disclose location
  - Bus stop signs reflected in pupil
Denial Of Service

- Classically absorb compute, storage or bandwidth
  - Compute transforms into crypto currency
- Money
- Battery
Elevation of Privilege

• Many isolation breaks
  – Spectre/Meltdown EoP from cloud, browser
  – Rowhammer and RAMPage EoP from app
  – We’ll see more, and responses are mostly at the platform

• Disentangling device control can be impossible
  – “Depression of Privilege”
Threats Evolve: STRIDE - LM

• STRIDE + Lateral Movement
  – Variant that has some momentum for operations threat models
  – Isn’t lateral movement a subset of spoofing?
  – Extra ways to find threats can be helpful or annoying

• Only Microsoft can fix LM via asymmetric authN
  – Windows auth vs SSH & keys

• But if it helps you, use it
THREATS EVOLVE:
STRIDE IS ONE OF MANY APPROACHES
Kill Chain as Alternative to STRIDE

- Kill Chain & variants for operational threat models
- Unifiedkillchain.com for analysis & comparison
  - Doesn’t yet include threat genomics

Initial Foothold: Compromised System
- Reconnaissance
- Weaponization
- Delivery
- Social Engineering
- Exploitation
- Persistence
- Defense Evasion
- Command & Control

Pivoting

Network Propagation: Internal Network
- Discovery
- Privilege Escalation
- Execution
- Credential Access
- Lateral Movement

Access

Action on Objectives: Critical Asset Access
- Collection
- Exfiltration
- Target Manipulation
- Objectives
Adversarial Machine Learning

• To violate goals of your ML
• To bend your ML to attacker’s goals
• (Also, training data)
• Machine learning is code
  – Code has bugs
  – More complex code has more bugs

More on AML, See “Protecting the Protector”, by Holly Stewart, Jugal Parikh & Randy Treit, Thurs Noon, South Seas CDF
What goes wrong isn’t just sploits

CONFLICT & THREAT MODELING
Red Hen on Yelp

Active Cleanup Alert

This business recently made waves in the news, which often means that people come to this page to post their views on the news.

While we don’t take a stand one way or the other when it comes to these news events, we do work to remove both positive and negative posts that appear to be motivated more by the news coverage itself than the reviewer’s personal consumer experience with the business.

As a result, your posts to this page may be removed as part of our cleanup process beginning Saturday, June 23, 2018, but you should feel free to post your thoughts about the recent media coverage for this business on Yelp Talk at any time.

Got it, thanks!
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are we working on?</td>
<td>A system with social aspects or UGC (user generated content)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What can go wrong?</td>
<td>Conflict as well as exploit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are we going to do?</td>
<td>Intuitive measures often fail, we should catalog &amp; study defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did we do a good job?</td>
<td>😡</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Four Question Frame Works for Conflict*
What Goes Wrong: Inter-personal Conflict

• Explicitly adapting threat modeling to conflict
• Shireen Mitchell & Jon Pincus diversity approach
• Amanda Levendowski’s SCULPT (in progress)
  – Safety, comfort, usability, legal, privacy, and transparency
  – Focus on mitigation techniques
• Used by nation states!
Harass person

Trigger them
- Images
- Threats

Flood them with messages
- Get people to help
- Botnet

Make them look bad
- Spoof account
- Hack account

From “Transforming Tech with Diversity-friendly software” by Jon Pincus & Shireen Mitchell
Internet trolls are even more hostile when they’re using their real names, a study finds
What to Do? Learn from Success

• Nextdoor “private social network for your neighborhood”
• Had a problem with racial profiling in posts
• A/B tested 6 ways to add detail when post mentions race

• Says new forms have “reduced posts containing racial profiling by 75%...”
What to do about conflict?

- Fixes for conflict are less obvious
- Need expertise in human behavior to design
- Need a catalog of effective design patterns
- Github.com/adamshostack/conflictmodeling
Summary: Threats

- STRIDE instances evolve
- Adversarial Machine learning is fun
- Conflict looms
Key Takeaways

• Fundamental skills of threat modeling remain important
• Details of what we’re working on, how we work and threats are all changing
• Importance of conflict modeling
Thank you!

Also thanks to the team at Continuum, John DiLeo, Jim Gumbley, Shamiq Islam, Jonathan Marcil, Michael Maass, Irene Michlin, Fraser Scott, Izar Tarandach, Steven Wierckx, and many others on the OWASP threatmodeling slack

(Join us! Owasp.slack.com)
Questions?

adam@shostack.org
associates.shostack.org